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A DISTRIBUTIVE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
AYA GRUBER*
ABSTRACT
In criminal law circles, the accepted wisdom is that there are two
and only two true justifications of punishmentretributivism and
utilitarianism. The multitude of moral claims about punishment
may thus be reduced to two propositions: (1) punishment should be
imposed because defendants deserve it, and (2) punishment should
be imposed because it makes society safer. At the same time, most
penal scholars notice the trend in criminal law to de-emphasize
intent, centralize harm, and focus on victims, but they largely write
off this trend as an irrational return to antiquated notions of
vengeance. This Article asserts that there is in fact a distributive
logic to the changes in current criminal law. The distributive theory
of criminal law holds that an offender ought to be punished, not
because he is culpable or because punishment increases net security,
but because punishment appropriately distributes pleasure and pain
between the offender and victim. Criminal laws are accordingly
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank Jorge
Esquirol, Duncan Kennedy, Randy Benzanson, Arthur Bonfield, Cyra Choudhury, andré
cummings, Michelle Falkoff, Herb Hovenkamp, Nick Johnson, Cynthia Lee, Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Todd Pettys, Carolyn Ramsey, Pierre Schlag, Peggie Smith, Sascha Somek,
Jerry Wetlaufer, and Ahmed White for their helpful input. This Article benefitted immensely
from presentation at the Iowa Legal Studies Workshop and the Colorado Faculty Colloquium.
1
2 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:001
distributive when they mete out punishment for the purpose of
ensuring victim welfare. 
This Article demonstrates how distribution both explains the
traditionally troubling criminal law doctrines of felony murder and
the attempt-crime divide, and makes sense of current victim-centered
reforms. Understanding much of modern criminal law as distribu-
tion highlights an interesting political contradiction. For the past
few decades, one, if not the most, dominant political message has
emphasized rigorous individualism and has held that the state is
devoid of power to deprive a faultless person of goods (or “rights”)
in order to ensure the welfare of another. But many who condemn
distribution through the civil law or tax system embrace punishment
of faultless defendants to distribute satisfaction to crime victims.
Exposing criminal law as distributionist undermines these individu-
als’ claimed pre-political commitment against government distribu-
tion.
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[A]s a simple matter of distributive justice, a decent and
compassionate society should recognize the plight of its victims
and design its criminal system to alleviate their pain, not
increase it.
Anthony Kennedy 1           
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, penal theorists have debated the ethical origins of
criminal liability and punishment. From the collective theorizing
of thousands of the brightest minds, tomes of legal literature, and
hundreds of years of debate, two predominant justifications of
criminal punishment have emerged: retributivism and utilitarian-
ism.2 Although there are multiple twists on these themes, the basic
concept is that criminal liability is justified either because the of-
fender deserves punishment3 or because punishment makes society
safer, whether through deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation.4
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that, contrary to most
conventional thought, the philosophy underlying many areas of
modern American criminal law has less to do with fault or utility
than with distribution. Distribution involves fashioning legal rules
to achieve a desirable equilibrium between specific individuals or
between individuals and society.5 In private disputes, when two
1. Judge Anthony Kennedy, Address at the Sixth South Pacific Judicial Conference (Mar.
3-5, 1987), in George Nicholson, Victims’ Rights, Remedies, and Resources: A Maturing
Presence in American Jurisprudence, 23 PAC. L.J. 815, 828 (1992).
2. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282,
1284 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (calling these the “dominant approaches”); PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 83 (2005) (stating that
utilitarianism and retributivism are the traditional punishment justifications).
3. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1988) [hereinafter Moral
Worth] (commenting that retributivism is a “straightforward theory” that justifies punishment
“only because offenders deserve it”).
4. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2002) [hereinafter Deterring Retributivism] (calling
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence the “principal consequentialist theories of
punishment”).
5. See Richard O. Brooks, “The Refurbishing”: Reflections upon Law and Justice Among
the Stages of Life, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 666 (2006) (observing that distributive justice
requires “various goods [be] distributed according to some criterion”); infra Part IV.
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persons’ interests conflict over a scarce good, a distributive principle
dictates that the resource be allocated in a just way, which may or
may not involve rights claims or maximizing utility.6 
The distributive theory of criminal law holds that an offender
ought to be punished, not because he is culpable (as he may not
have intended harm) and not because such punishment increases
net security in the world (as it empirically may not), but because
punishment appropriately distributes pleasure and pain between
the offender and victim.7 In the tort context, scholarly literature and
case law engage in compelling analyses of rules that impose liability
as a means to secure a fair distribution between parties, particu-
larly of the strict liability doctrine.8 Analogous to tort’s distribution
of wealth from defendant to plaintiff, criminal rules often distribute
punishment to defendants in order to secure a good such as com-
pensation, satisfaction, or “closure” for victims.9 Today, the distribu-
tive aspects of criminal law are quite visible, as discourse regarding
closure and “making victims whole” normatively endorses that
criminal law should ensure a fair outcome by distributing pain to
offenders and thereby satisfaction to victims.10 
6. See John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1027, 1064 (2003) (noting that “distributions involve proportion; more to some means
less to others”); Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 965,
986 (2000) (observing that distributive justice involves “how to allocate scarce goods among
moral equals”); infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
7. See Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1523, 1558-59 (2007) [hereinafter Four Reflections] (asserting that in distributive theories it
matters not how but only that a person was hurt). 
8. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 228 n.43 (1996) (describing modern tort law as
a “‘struggle’ between the relatively limited liability of negligence and the redistributive power
of strict liability” (quoting Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 449, 467 (1992))); Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 727-28 (2008) (describing distributive justice
as a predominant justification of tort law). 
9. Distribution does not have to involve wealth. See Julian Larmont & Christi Favor,
Distributive Justice, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUSTICE (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive (noting that distributive principles “can
vary in what is subject to distribution”).
10. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the Role
of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (2000) (noting the argument that failure to
impose death is an “infliction of pain upon the victim’s family”); Guyora Binder, Victims and
the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 713, 735-36 (2008) [hereinafter
Significance of Causing Harm] (reciting the argument that “humiliation of the offender”
vindicates victims); infra notes 262-64, 267 and accompanying text. Because pain and
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Despite the fact that certain criminal policies have long reflected
distributive values,11 and distributive sentiments are apparent in
the ideology and policies of the victims’ rights movement,12 penal
theorists and criminal law scholars virtually ignore the possibility
of a distributive theory of punishment. Consider Sanford Kadish’s
argument:
It is hard to see ... how inflicting pain on the criminal restores
anything—certainly it doesn’t restore the victim to his property
or compensate him for his economic loss or for his medical
expenses and pain and suffering. And even if it somehow did, in
the unpalatable sense that the victim received a restorative
amount of pleasure from the offender’s suffering, it is not the
morality of retributive punishment that would have been
demonstrated, but the desirability of satisfying the vengeful
feelings of the victim, which is not the same thing.13
Theorists also assert that criminal law’s exclusive blaming function
makes the question of distribution misplaced.14 However, in recent
times, scholars have noted the many ways in which tort theory and
criminal law theory overlap.15 Moreover, financial restoration
through tort suits is not the principal distributive intervention
pleasure do not appear scarce, the distributive function of punishment is not obvious. See
Scheffler, supra note 6, at 986 (asserting that punishment is unrelated to “conditions of
scarcity”); Christopher D. Stone, Comment, Sentencing the Corporation, 71 B.U. L. REV. 383,
392 (1991) (calling crime victims’ losses “undistributable”).
11. See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 129 (1996) (observing expansion of “nonfault criminal liability”).
12. See infra Part III.
13. Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 692-93 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also Stephen J. Morse,
Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 426 (2004) (stating
that punishment “does not make the victim or society whole”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm
and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1974) (describing emphasis on harm as a “vestige” of early
emphasis on vengeance).
14. See, e.g., Mark Perlman, Punishing Acts and Counting Consequences, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
227, 229 (1995) (noting the view that responsibility for compensating for outcomes is
appropriate only in tort law).
15. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991)
(observing “the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law”).
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sought by victims’ rights advocates, and lawmakers are responsive
to the restoration-through-punishment argument.16 
Understanding the distributive basis of criminal law and its
current popularity reveals an interesting political contradiction.
Redistributive programs have historically been products of left-
progressive politics, engendering counterattacks from the right.17 In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concern over
legislatures’ distributionist use of police power18 prompted a legal
response that emphasized property rights and freedom of contract.19
Despite the decline of Lochnerism, over time, liberalism (meaning
rights-regarding not left-leaning) became the dominant mode of
legal reasoning for both conservatives and progressives.20 Today,
redistribution is a principal normative evil to conservatives,21
marginally useful to mainstream Liberals,22 and appealing only to
leftists. 
Many consider state regulation of one individual to establish
some level of welfare for another fundamentally unjust.23 The
16. See infra notes 267, 336-37 and accompanying text.
17. Although all legal rules affect distribution, many are not made in the name of
distribution. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
18. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 27-
31 (1992). 
19. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 64 (1905) (holding that work hour
restrictions violate constitutional “freedom of contract”); see HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 29-30
(observing Lochner’s distinction between police power “in fact” and “redistribution ‘under
pretence of regulation’” (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston,
Little, Brown 1868))); Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly,
Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1180 (noting Lochner’s
claim “that redistribution of resources is not within [state] police power”).
20. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 189 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Critique of Rights] (asserting that “rights now bear the main burden of universalization for
both” Liberals and conservatives).
21. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV.
641, 651-52 (1990) (remarking that conservatism is “united by an aversion to the
redistributive normative authority of the political state”).
22. See Critique of Rights, supra note 20, at 217 (observing that Liberals feel a “sense of
danger” in abandoning rights claims); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive
Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1980) (noting that Liberals support baseline redistribution but
generally reject private law distribution). In this Article, “Liberals” refers to persons
associated with the modern-day Democratic Party, while “liberals” refers to persons following
classical liberal philosophy.
23. See Kronman, supra note 22, at 473 (remarking that libertarians “deny that the state
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standard libertarian view endorses as its utopian vision a society
in which atomistic individuals pursue any private end, and the
government plays the minimal role of protecting a bare-bones set
of rights.24 This antidistribution narrative has been popular since
the 1970s,25 when politicians capitalized on public dissatisfaction
with Great Society policies and government spending to popularize
the hyper-individualism ethic.26 At the same time, a parallel just-
ification for limiting distribution arose in the form of economic
arguments about efficiency.27 Today, efficiency concerns and liber-
alism meld to form a neoliberal paradigm that conceives of the
pursuit of capital as one, if not the most, fundamental right.28 The
criminal system, however, appears insulated from these principles.29
is ever justified in forcibly redistributing wealth”); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2004) (noting the view
that “any redistribution [is] necessarily unjust”). 
24. See Kenneth W. Starr, From Fraser to Frederick: Bong Hits and the Decline of Civic
Culture, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 661, 662 n.4 (2009) (stating that libertarians define humans
in “individualistic, atomistic terms” and support “‘freedom from all forms of social and legal
constraint’” (quoting AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE 34 (1996))). See generally
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix passim (1974) (advocating a “minimal state,
limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of
contracts, and so on”).
25. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s
Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2007) (book review) [hereinafter Thinking with Wolves]
(observing that the Right has successfully undermined ideas grounding the twentieth-century
welfare state).
26. See ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 92 (2003) (noting the dominant American belief in
minimal government); Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging
the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 803 (2003) [hereinafter Social
Citizenship] (observing that this shift occurred amidst “global economic changes” and “white
backlash” to government-supported racial equality).
27. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing law and economics). 
28. In this view, the state must promote the “will of the economic actor.” West, supra note
21, at 657-58; see also Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7
THEORY & EVENT 1, 6 (2003), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/
v007/7.1brown.html (noting the current configuration of morality as “rational deliberation
about costs”).
29. Some scholars observe the interconnectedness of the criminal system’s growth and
welfare’s decline. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 581, 618-23 (2009) [hereinafter Rape and Feminism] (asserting that the war on crime
supported antiwelfare ideology); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the
Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 819 (2005) (asserting
that neoliberalism motivated a “shift in the social control of the lower classes” from welfare
to criminal law).
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Critics thus note with irony that the criminal regulatory system
has grown to embody a massive and inefficient taxing-and-spending
program that distributes funds to carceral programs nearly exclu-
sively for the poor.30 The substance of criminal law also became
more distributionist as considerations of culpability and deterrence
gave way to concerns over victims’ interests.31 
This Article offers an analytically descriptive account of facets
of criminal law as distributive phenomena. Criminal laws are
distributive when they mete out punishment for the primary
purpose of ensuring victim welfare. A question might arise whether
it is desirable or morally appropriate for the government to use
criminal law to distribute pleasure to victims. Whether and to what
extent criminal law should incorporate victim welfare as a con-
sideration cannot be answered in the abstract any more than the
question of what should be taxed and how much. Nevertheless, a
cogent argument may be made that ensuring victim welfare through
punishment is bad policy because victims actually heal through
forgiveness,32 or because in certain circumstances jailing offenders
makes victims worse off.33 One could also critique incorporating
victims’ interests into criminal policy on the ground that it inevita-
bly strengthens the current oppressive carceral state.34 These
arguments do not establish that distributing through criminal law
is inherently bad, just that it appears unjustified in its current form
and context. 
30. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2004 (2008)
(observing that conservatives support “redistributive” criminal justice spending); White, supra
note 29, at 820 (arguing that the current neoliberal regime is “a contradictory blend”
supporting capitalism and “illiberal” social norms).
31. See infra Part III.
32. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 998
(1985) (asserting that victims heal through “[f]orgiveness, rather than vengeance”); infra
notes 265-66 and accompanying text (discussing restorative justice).
33. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 803-09 (2007)
[hereinafter Feminist War] (describing how arresting and jailing batterers may make battered
women worse off).
34. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 26 (2002) [hereinafter
VICTIMS’ IN THE WAR ON CRIME] (opining that during the war on crime, victims were rhetorical
tools to enhance state authority); Feminist War, supra note 33, at 772 (stating that “[a]s a tool
of tough-on-crime penological goals, the victim must occupy a specific, predefined legal space”
that supports punitive policies).
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Proving that the criminal law should never engage in distribu-
tion, however, is not the goal of this Article. Rather, the Article
seeks to demonstrate two things. First, it will show that much of
criminal law is actually distributive, rather than retributive or
utilitarian, a possibility ignored thus far in the penal literature.35
Second, it will undermine the claims of those who reject progressive
laws and policies on the principled ground that the government
should never engage in distribution. A popular view is that the state
is devoid of power to deprive a person of his legitimate goods or
“rights” in order to ensure the welfare of another, however welfare
is measured.36 But many of the same voices that condemn distribu-
tion through the civil law or tax system embrace criminal punish-
ment to ensure victim satisfaction.37 Thus, the distributive theory
of criminal law exposes that society’s distributionist sentiments
have not evaporated in the face of seemingly neutral arguments
regarding rights, economics, and limited government. Rather, soci-
ety retains alternating instincts about individual rights, efficiency,
and distributive fairness.38 Lawmakers appeal to and marshal these
instincts to serve distinct political interests and constituencies.
Today, society’s instincts have been marshaled to favor tort fault
rules that benefit powerful corporate defendants but to reject the
requirement of criminal fault for the benefit of politically salient
crime victims.39
Part I of this Article defines distribution and discusses it in the
context of tort and penal theory. Part II demonstrates that distri-
butionist sentiments have long existed in American criminal law by
analyzing the classically controversial doctrines of felony murder
and the attempt-crime divide. Part III turns to modern criminal law
and describes how concerns over distributive fairness to victims
are increasingly replacing retribution and deterrence principles.
Finally, Part IV maintains that power, race, and politics lie at the
heart of why many reject government distribution as a matter of
35. See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (2005) (asserting that punishment is “not primarily redistributive”).
36. See Kronman, supra note 22, at 498 (remarking that libertarianism “regards
compulsory transfers aimed at achieving distributive fairness as a kind of theft”); supra notes
23-24.
37. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Part IV.
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principle when it involves ensuring the welfare of the poor but
heartily embrace distribution when crime victims’ interests are at
stake. 
I. DISTRIBUTION IN TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW
Distributive justice, in its broad sense, means the fair apportion-
ment of benefits and burdens in society.40 In its narrow sense,
distribution pertains to the fair allocation of goods between private
individuals who dispute over scarce resources.41 Here, the relevant
egalitarian measure is “localized” between parties to the dispute,
rather than between individuals and society.42 The distributive
theory of criminal law in this Article is about local distribution
between criminal defendants and victims, and it regards solely
those criminal laws whose principal justification appears to be
satisfying victims’ interests, as society constructs them, by imposing
punishment on offenders.43 Thus, this Article is not about how to
distribute punishment throughout society (that is, what ought to be
a crime).44 Nor is it about constructing criminal law to respond to
social inequality.45 Rather, this Article’s theory of criminal distri-
bution simply means depriving an offender of liberty in order to
increase the well-being of the victim, much like taxation deprives an
individual of money in order to ensure the welfare of others.
In addition, the ideas in this Article should be kept distinct from
the critique that all legal rules are distributive in nature, regardless
of purported alternative justifications. Critical legal scholars have
40. See V ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1130b-1131a (Terence Irwin trans., 1985)
(asserting that distributive justice involves providing a fair share of “honours or wealth or
anything else that can be divided”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 274-84 (1971) (setting
forth background institutions that ensure “justice as fairness” but not endorsing socialism
over capitalism). 
41. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 37-38 (2002)
(noting that “‘distributive’ refers to the allocation of a particular loss between the disputing
parties”).
42. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 461
(1992) (observing that distribution may be “localized” where the relevant “group is limited to
the victim and her injurer”) (emphasis omitted). 
43. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
44. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2008).
45. Rehabilitation is distributionist in this sense. See Four Reflections, supra note 7, at
1554.
12 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:001
long censured proponents of rights, fault, and other seemingly
neutral rules for using arbitrary deontic principles to obscure the
maldistributive and inegalitarian effects of certain legal arrange-
ments.46 For example, critics have asserted that the claim “the
guilty should be punished” uses the purportedly objective philo-
sophical concept of desert to obscure a legal regime that at best
produces inequality and at worst deliberately preserves hierarchy.47
This Article, however, does not presume that retributivism and
utilitarianism are merely political mechanisms to camouflage unfair
distribution.48 Rather, it assumes that retributivism and utilitarian-
ism are coherent philosophical constructs that satisfactorily explain
many areas of criminal law, but it exposes distinctly distributionist
criminal rules by analyzing certain doctrines that cannot be
rationalized by retributivism or utilitarianism. 
A. Fault, Utility, and Distribution in Tort Law 
Distributive theorizing has long been a staple of tort law
analysis.49 Courts and scholars describe strict liability rules as a
matter of distributive justice when they seek to fairly distribute the
cost of accidents between injurers and injureds.50 To the question,
“Who should be liable for purely accidental injury?” the distributive
46. See generally Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary
Essay, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 205 (2005) (observing that critical theorists “uncover
the multifarious ways in which legal doctrine and institutions constitute, perpetuate and
reflect social disadvantage”); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981) (demonstrating how interpretive constructs create
substantive criminal rules that preserve social hierarchy). 
47. See Kelman, supra note 46, at 646-47 (focusing on arbitrary temporal lines accepted
by retributivism that exclude considerations of defendant background); Alice Ristroph, How
(Not) To Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 747 (2009) (demonstrating that “desert-
thinking” may “provide[ ] a safe harbor for racial disparity”).
48. Mark Kelman argues that retributivism serves “ideological needs”: “if one reacts with
enough horror and shock at the idea of punishing those one defines as faultless without
paying much attention to how faultlessness is defined—perhaps one can ... simply rule out the
determinist claim that ‘crime is unavoidable.’” Kelman, supra note 46, at 611. 
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50. See Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 406
(1959) (asserting that loss distribution “may be based on the [financial] capacity of the class
of persons such as defendant in comparison with the class of persons such as plaintiff”); see,
e.g., Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 58 (N.M. 1995) (quoting Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982)) (calling strict liability fair because it
places the cost of industry “upon those who profit” instead of “‘the innocent victim’”).
2010] DISTRIBUTIVE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 13
answer is whomever placing liability upon will secure a fair equi-
librium.51 For example, Judge Traynor famously opined in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno that “[t]he cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public.”52
Thus, distributive justice demands that the “the burdens and
benefits of risky activities [be] fairly apportioned.”53 
Opposition to tort law distribution manifests through arguments
about fault and utility. Turning to fault arguments first, early
twentieth-century theorists countered the principle that tort law
should be about balancing costs by characterizing tort liability
as a form of punishment only appropriate for those at fault.54
Antidistributionist courts and scholars reframed the question of
who should bear the burden of accidents as who deserves to pay.55
However, emphasizing fault would be ineffective at completely
stamping out distribution without a narrow concept of causation.56
If many parties could be termed at fault, plaintiffs could proceed
against only wealthy defendants.57 Fault and causation rules thus
work together to narrow the class of defendants who deserve
liability.58 These distribution-thwarting rules appeal to those with
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (noting the strict liability
argument “that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption
be placed upon those who market them”).
52. 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
53. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 200 (2000).
54. See Paul J. Zwier, “Cause in Fact” in Tort Law—A Philosophical and Historical
Examination, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 799, 802 (1982) (characterizing early twentieth-century
tort law as a contest between realists who emphasized social need and natural law theorists
who emphasized fault).
55. See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy, and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the
Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1990) (describing tort law “as an
attempt to punish conduct which violates certain core values”).
56. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks,
37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 475 n.130 (1990) (stating that libertarians embrace cause as “an
objective phenomenon” that cannot be “manipulated” for distributionist purposes).
57. See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 52. 
58. See Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91,
95 (1995) (describing redistribution as “morally impermissible” because individuals must
“shoulder the costs of misfortunes they did not cause”).
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libertarian sentiments,59 those favoring industrial growth,60 and
those who believe judges are incompetent to engage in efficient or
fair wealth distribution.61 In addition, through analogizing tort
damages to punishment, negligence proponents can maintain that
holding an innocent tortfeasor liable is morally unjust.62 This
enables them to assert that the move from strict liability to
negligence was not just a product of early twentieth-century courts’
desires to subsidize industry, but the arrival of courts at the
philosophically enlightened legal rule.63
In the latter twentieth century, a distinct attack on private law
distribution emerged in the form of law and economics, which
explains and justifies tort law with reference to efficiency.64 The idea
is that tort liability rules should and often do encourage would-be
injurers and injureds to act in maximally efficient manners.65
Critical legal scholar Duncan Kennedy describes law and economics
59. Id.
60. See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 124 (characterizing negligence as “the doctrine of an
emerging entrepreneurial class” that argued against liability for injurious but “socially
desirable activity”).
61. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 229 (doubting whether courts possess expertise
and authority to distribute); cf. Kronman, supra note 22, at 501 (observing that the judicial
competence argument does not prove “distributional effects should also be ignored in the
initial design of a system”).
62. See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 124 (commenting that courts viewed strict liability as
“an amoral doctrine” because it imposed liability without blameworthiness); Robert J. Rhee,
Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 181 (2008) (noting that negligence is often equated with
blameworthiness).
63. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908)
(describing the move to negligence as an “ethical standard of reasonable conduct ... replac[ing]
the unmoral standard of acting at one’s peril”); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy
in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733-34 (1981)
(asserting that rejection of strict liability reflected the popular academic view of strict liability
as “unmoral”).
64. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 66-97 (1972); see also Gary
Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 604 (1989) (calling
law and economics “a ‘new’ methodology and jurisprudential theory” from the 1970s); Gary
T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1803 (1997) [hereinafter Mixed Theories] (tracing the “explosion” of law
and economics scholarship to early works of Calabresi and Posner).
65. See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 820 (2008)
(observing that law and economics views tort law as a means to the “optimal level of accident
avoidance”). The dominant school of law and economics, the Chicago School, endorses a
normative view of efficiency, although not all schools do. Compare Minda, supra note 64, at
609, with Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 353-56
(1984) (stating that law and economics theories may be descriptive or predictive). 
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as a response in part to “the gigantic liberal law reform project ...
carried out in the courts after World War I.”66 To conservatives who
decry the undemocratic and inefficient nature of redistributing in
private cases, the law and economics approach, which heralds
efficiency as a determinate method of adjudicating private disputes,
leaving larger distributive questions to be addressed by the
democratic legislature, has natural appeal.67 Thus, since the 1980s,
a main scholarly project has been to encourage purging distri-
butionist considerations from individual cases and claim that such
concerns should be addressed, if at all, through large-scale pro-
grammatic policies.68 There is, however, some potential conceptual
overlap of utilitarian and distributive accounts of tort law:69 effi-
ciency may dictate distributively satisfying rules;70 legal decisions
made in the name of distributive fairness could end up being
“efficient”; and some might support redistribution because an
economically secure populace is utile.71 Nonetheless, despite some
conceptual spillage, fault supporters, utilitarians, and distribu-
tionists have staked out relatively distinct philosophical grounds for
tort law.72
66. See Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 468 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Law and Economics] (observing that conservatives needed
“a new method that would produce results more in tune with their views of economic
rationality”). 
67. See id. (noting the conservative view that judicial progressivism is antidemocratic and
counterproductive). Duncan Kennedy critiques progressive efficiency theory on the grounds
that the cost internalization argument assumes a preexisting liberal regime, and that
hypothesizing about perfect bargaining over joint costs produces indeterminate results.
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.
387, 395-98 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994); see also Aditi
Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 143 (2008)
(characterizing as “common wisdom” the rejection of “ad hoc” distribution in individual cases).
69. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 168-69 (1986) (observing that “maximizing [interests] is a distributive
principle”). However, utilitarians might not “address the problem of distribution as such.”
Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 289 (2003).
70. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 97 (1995)
(advocating strict liability on efficiency grounds); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-6 (1980). 
71. See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 112 (noting the possibility that one could, “in the name
of utility,” seek to “redistribute wealth”).
72. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 41, at 29 n.26 (2002) (noting the “common belief”
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B. Retribution, Utility, and Distribution in Criminal Law
The fault and efficiency foundations of tort law find symmetry
with similar penal theories that base criminal liability on cul-
pability or the production of utility through crime reduction.73
Fault-based or retributivist accounts of criminal liability are often
traced to Immanuel Kant’s “categorical imperative,” which defines
ethical behavior as choices that are moral a priori (not subject to
experiential reasoning) and universalizable.74 The nutshell way of
describing retributivism is that offenders “should be punished only
because and to the extent that they deserve it,” regardless of any
benefit to society.75 Retributivism demands that the defendant’s
culpability alone determine punishment, and hence it is called an
“agent-relative” doctrine.76 Thus, “retribution” as it is used in this
Article should be distinguished from more colloquial characteriza-
that distribution is “unimportant” in law and economics); Law and Economics, supra note 66,
at 468 (remarking that law and economics “made a sharp distinction between efficiency
oriented and distributively oriented decision-making”).
73. See Mixed Theories, supra note 64, at 1811 (describing retribution and utility in
criminal law as similar to correction and efficiency in tort law).
74. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 89 (H.J. Paton trans.,
Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) [hereinafter METAPHYSIC OF MORALS] (“Act as if the maxim
of your action were to become through your will a universal law.”); see also IMMANUEL KANT,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796) (stating that
“Juridical Punishment” must be imposed “only because the individual on whom it is inflicted
has committed a Crime”). The categorical imperative is “connected (entirely a priori) with the
concept of the will,” METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra at 74, and thus originates from “the a
priori conditions of human cognition,” Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to
Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 451
n.61 (2004) [hereinafter Righting Wrongs].
75. Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1835-36 (1999)
[hereinafter Atonement]; see also Moral Worth, supra note 3, at 179. There is a critique of
retributivism as “circular or empty.” See Deterring Retributivism, supra note 4, at 861 (citing
critics). In response, some espouse a mixed theory whereby utilitarian considerations dictate
what should be a crime and retributivism limits punishment. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-12 (1968); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 179-209 (1982). 
76. See Righting Wrongs, supra note 74, at 445.
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tions of the principle as revenge.77 A harmed victim might “seek
retribution” whether or not the defendant is culpable.78 
Although retributivists nearly universally define culpability with
reference to mens rea,79 they vastly differ on the kinds of mental
states sufficient for liability. Retributivists generally believe that
acting with more intention, for example purposefully, is more
culpable than acting with less intention, for example negligently.80
However, some theorists entertain the possibility that being unable
to recognize certain risks is sufficiently morally blameworthy to
merit retributive condemnation.81 Of course, there are numerous
retributivist objections to premising criminal liability on negli-
gence, and many reject that negligence establishes culpability.82
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this Article, arguments that
equate negligence with fault fall under the retributive taxonomy.83
77. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009-10 (3d Cir. 1988) (asserting that
retribution focuses on victims’ interests); cf. Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group
Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 273, 283 (2005). 
78. See Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict
Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 75 (1990) (calling this “‘harm-based’ retributivism,” which
many theorists reject).
79. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 248 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting that mens rea ensures the punished are “morally blameworthy”); Kyron Huigens, The
Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 956 (2000) (calling mens
rea “essentially retributivist”).
80. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary
Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 766 (2007)
(observing that retributivism differentiates between negligent and intentional acts); Andrew
E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 90 n.430
(2003) (correlating blame with levels of intent).
81. See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 105 (Daniel Farnham ed.,
2007) (claiming that failure to recognize risks reflects an actor’s choice not to develop
adequate moral faculties); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The
Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 397 (1994) (finding
punishment for “culpable indifference” retributively appropriate). But see Michael D. Bayles,
Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, in 1 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 5, 11 (1982)
(“Failure to conform to a standard of care on one occasion does not indicate an attitude of
indifference to standards of care.”).
82. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 119, 135-36 n.45 (2008) (“[N]egligence is (most often) an illegitimate basis upon which
to premise retributive punishment.”); Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 249, 270 (1996) (concluding that “negligence cannot be construed as deontologically
wrongful”); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985) (prescribing recklessness as the minimum
level of intent). 
83. See John C. Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
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Retributive concepts may also underlie other required elements of
crimes, for example, the requirement of actus reus.84 
Utilitarian penal discourse premises punishment on the produc-
tion of a beneficial state of affairs, namely security against crime,85
and generally focuses on three main theories: deterrence, incapaci-
tation, and rehabilitation.86 Utilitarianism is considered at odds
with retributivism because it sacrifices the a priori principle of
desert to a posteriori considerations of utility.87 Rehabilitation,
which purports to produce utility by reforming criminals, is cur-
rently unpopular,88 having been rejected as welfarist89 and insuffi-
ciently retributive because it confers “benefits” on criminals.90 Thus,
for several decades, deterrence has been the most visible utilitarian
justification, with incapacitation recently coming into vogue.91
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1372 (1979) (observing that most scholars find
negligence “a minimally sufficient basis of guilt”).
84. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881) (calling it unjust to
punish one who did not act). But see Theodore Y. Blumoff, A Jurisprudence for Punishing
Attempts Asymmetrically, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 951, 983 n.98 (2003) (noting that retribution’s
concern with intent “rais[es] the question, why wait for an act?”).
85. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U.
L. REV. 124, 131 (2000) (observing that utilitarianism authorizes punishment only “if some
good can flow from it”).
86. See Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071,
1079 (1964); supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 85, at 133 (observing the persuasiveness
of this objection to utilitarianism); John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1137
(2009) (noting the criticism that utilitarians support “punishment of the innocent when that
would increase overall utility”).
88. Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic’s View, 102 DICK.
L. REV. 355, 362 (1998) (“Today, rehabilitation is dead.”); Righting Wrongs, supra note 74, at
459 (noting that today, discussion of rehabilitation is “largely academic”).
89. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 75 (2001) (attributing rehabilitation’s retrenchment in part to “a
dominant political block that defined itself in opposition to old style ‘welfarism’”); Darryl K.
Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329 (2004) (commenting
that the purpose of punishment has changed from rehabilitation “to a mixture of deterrence,
incapacitation, and retribution”).
90. See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1505 (2003) (noting the argument that
treatment is “soft on crime”).
91. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1620 (1994) [hereinafter Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory] (calling
incapacitation “the dominant goal of punishment”); Michael Tonry, Learning from the
Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 CRIME & JUST. 279, 285 (2008) (observing the
popularity of the deterrence justification for “tough-on-crime” initiatives during the 1990s);
2010] DISTRIBUTIVE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 19
Today, it is common to encounter arguments characterizing certain
criminals as undeterrable and calling for permanent incapacita-
tion.92 
Critics advance many arguments against penal utilitarianism,
for example, that deterrence theory makes false assumptions about
the actual psychology of potential offenders.93 Despite a plethora of
critiques, utilitarianism thrives.94 Its adherents, like retributivists,
use utilitarianism to explain existing criminal law elements. They
describe the mens rea requirement as recognizing that uninten-
tional harmers are not dangerous and cannot be deterred from doing
that which they never intended.95 Actus reus reflects the view that
it is inefficient to sanction individuals who have chosen not to
harm.96 
Distribution in the criminal context has not been theorized as it
has in the tort context. Nevertheless, it appears evident that retri-
bution and utility bear the same hostile relationship to criminal
distribution as fault and efficiency bear to tort distribution. Penal
distribution dictates that the criminal receive the amount of
punishment that restores the victim to an appropriate state.97 To
infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (approving indefinite civil
commitment of “those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control”); 142 CONG. REC. 10,312 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (advocating
incapacitation to counter predators’ “restless and unrelenting prowl for children”). 
93. See JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE 94-96 (1996) (critiquing deterrence as “based on
complete and utter ignorance of what violent people are actually like”); Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 459-65 (1997) (advancing these
criticisms). 
94. See Steven K. Erickson, Mind Over Morality, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2007)
(reviewing CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL (2006)) (positing
that deterrence criticisms “never gain much popular traction” because the public supports the
criminal system); Righting Wrongs, supra note 74, at 458 (noting that utilitarian punishment
justifications “resonate the most strongly”).
95. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1931) (1882) (“Punishments are
inefficacious when directed against individuals who could not know the law, who have acted
without intention.”); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1248-49 (1985) (contending that harm
tends to be greater when there is intent).
96. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction To Resolve the Dispute
over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. KAN. L. REV.
1005, 1026 (1995) (stating “only voluntary acts are deterrable”). 
97. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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put it in tort-like terms, when a defendant is not punished, the
victim must “bear the entire burden” of the crime, whereas imposing
punishment relieves the victim from shouldering the entire
suffering burden.98 The punishment dictated by the victim’s need for
closure may be less or more than what constitutes appropriate
deterrence or desert. 
Recently, a somewhat related school of retributivism, which holds
that the culpable “deserve” to compensate victims, has emerged.99
The concept that law serves a compensatory function has been a
staple of tort theorizing for generations.100 Tort scholars describe
this apparently deontological basis for tort law in terms of the moral
priority of a wrongdoer “fixing” his wrongs.101 Analyzing the correc-
tive basis of tort liability has been done with great care elsewhere,102
but I will make some brief remarks here. Corrective justice occu-
pies a philosophical middle ground between retributivism and
distributionism because it requires fault as the trigger for liability
and distribution as its corollary. Although the ability of an injurer
to compensate does not create liability, an injurer who is at fault
and thus liable must compensate.103 Some describe correction
98. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 51, 52-55, 58-59 (1999); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992) (calling retribution “a
form of compensation to the victim”).
100. See Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1605, 1641 (2007) (characterizing compensatory justice as a principal justification of
tort law).
101. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349,
357 (1992) [hereinafter Corrective Justice Demands] (asserting that corrective justice
“demands that wrongful (or unjust) gains and losses be rectified”); Margaret J. Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 60 (1993) (opining that corrective
justice creates a state between victim and injurer that is “morally appropriate ... to the status
quo ante”).
102. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1992); Corrective Justice Demands, supra note 101;
Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 381, 384-92 (1992);
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Monsanto Lectures: Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485,
498-99 (1989). See generally Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 625 (1992) (categorizing and analyzing various corrective justice theories).
103. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 232 (remarking that corrective justice involves “a
normative judgment regarding the specific harm-causing act”); Julie Chi-hye Suk,
Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 411-12 (2006)
(observing that corrective justice involves remedying wrongdoing whereas distributive justice
involves “just distribution”); cf. Four Reflections, supra note 7, at 1556 (noting that some
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retributively as constituting what the culpable actor deserves.104
However, it is not clear why restoring the victim is what one at fault
must do.105 Indeed, the retributive rationalization runs into even
more problems when the compensatory amount relates to unforesee-
able harms.106 
Many assert that compensation is required to vindicate the
value of victims.107 If valuing victims is key, however, it seems that
fault is not necessary. A person injured by faultless conduct is of
no lesser value than one injured through negligence. Corrective
justice proponents respond with the tautological argument that
only wrongdoing creates the need for victim vindication.108 But
then there is the issue of why only culpable action is normatively
related to correction.109 In the end, it may be that corrective justice
reflects both a distributionist mistrust of a society that forces
victims to bear the costs of accidental injuries110 and the reality of
theories of corrective justice use causation, not fault, as the basis for liability).
104. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 75 (1970) [hereinafter DOING AND
DESERVING] (describing tort liability as “reparation” for “wrongdo[ing],” in which the
tortfeasor “deserves to give”); John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v.
Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 468 n.128 (2006) (characterizing “Jules Coleman’s
more recent work” as advocating “redistributing losses ... to wrongdoers who have rendered
themselves deserving”); cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324-25 (1992)
(differentiating between those who produce compensable losses and the retributively culp-
able).
105. See Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make
Sense?, 6 LAW & PHIL. 1, 4 (1987) (maintaining that compensation may cause “suffering either
more than or less than retributively deserved”); Four Reflections, supra note 7, at 1557
(observing that compensation may be “not enough punishment” or may be “more than the
punishment one deserves”).
106. See DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 104, at 58-59 (contending that the facts
underlying desert “must be facts about that subject”). Hart and Honore rationalize the
correction of unforeseeable harms as a form of “make up” retribution, stating that it seems
fair to hold someone liable for unforeseeable loss “when we consider that a defendant is often
negligent without suffering punishment.” H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW 243 (2d ed. 1985). 
107. See, e.g., Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 348 (2007) (“Corrective justice ... provid[es] just desserts [sic] to
others.”).
108. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1249 (1988)
(book review) (observing that the victim’s “claim to compensation as a matter of justice is
analytically connected to ... the injurer’s conduct”).
109. A related objection is that distributing wealth is not true “compensation.” See Gregory
C. Keating, The Heroic Enterprise of the Asbestos Cases, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 623, 635-36 (2008)
(commenting that death “is beyond compensation”).
110. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal
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an individualized tort regime that prioritizes fault.111 Yet the re-
packaging of fault and distribution as correction produces disortive
effects that both retributivists and distributionists condemn.112 
Corrective accounts of criminal law have recently made their way
into the penal literature as victims become more important players
in the criminal system.113 Theorist George Fletcher, for example,
opines that retributive justice demands “seeking equality between
offender and victim by subjecting the offender to punishment.”114
The attempt to fit victim-based justifications of punishment into
a retributive framework has been met with skepticism from retri-
butivists,115 who conclude that Fletcher’s program “doesn’t look
retributive; it looks compensatory to the victims.”116 Moreover, even
if some consideration of victim welfare is compatible with retrib-
utivism, retributivism surely cannot tolerate punishment to
satisfy victims in the absence of intent-based culpability.117 Thus,
Fletcher does not approve of distributing pain to undeserving
defendants (or distributing more pain than deserved) as a means of
Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309, 343-44 (2004)
(asserting that corrective justice seeks to “rectify deviations” from the original “just
distribution”); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 233 (observing that “entitlements enforced by
corrective justice simply reduce to a form of distributional insurance”). Corrective justice
theorists respond that distributive justice cannot explain why tort law permits only recovery
from human injurers. The answer may be that tort law developed in an era when individual
suits were the only way to secure distribution and accidents were considered intentional. See
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 786 (1990) (observing that the
“misfortunes we now interpret as accidental ... often were construed as intentional by
reference to beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery”). 
111. Joel Feinberg explains tort liability as “[w]eak retributivism”: “if someone has got to
be hurt in [an] affair, let it be the wrongdoer.” DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 104, at 220.
112. See Abel, supra note 110, at 799 (“Tort damages deliberately reproduce the existing
distribution of wealth and income.”); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in
Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 43 (1994) (noting that corrective justice “ignores the plight
of those injured in the absence of provable fault”).
113. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 99; Hampton, supra note 99.
114. Fletcher, supra note 99, at 58.
115. See, e.g., Jesús-María Silva Sanchez, Doctrines Regarding “The Fight Against
Impunity” and “The Victim’s Right for the Perpetrator to be Punished,” 28 PACE L. REV. 865,
883 (2008) (“The theory of criminal law focused on the victim is not retributivist.”).
116. Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 65, 76 (1999). In addition, if “desert” is correction of harm, much of criminal law
cannot be rationalized because it does not involve harm. 
117. Jean Hampton endorses a corrective view of retribution that does not require harm
to the victim. See Hampton, supra note 99, at 1661.
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producing closure.118 He, like others, writes off any such program as
“reduc[ing] punishment to simple vengeance.”119 
Consequently, justifying criminal laws by reference to distrib-
utive ends is quite a separate endeavor from supporting laws that
retributively punish or achieve maximum deterrence.120 Although
distributive justice, retributivism, and utilitarianism may be used
to rationalize the same legal rule and often overlap in significant
ways, they are separate justificatory programs with their own sets
of supporters and detractors.121 Part II analyzes traditional criminal
laws that appear by many accounts unjustifiable by appeal to
retributivism and utilitarianism and reveals their true distributive
bases. 
II. DISTRIBUTION EXPLAINS CLASSIC CRIMINAL LAW QUANDARIES
This Part examines traditional criminal law doctrines that have
proven troubling to retributivists and utilitarians and determines
whether, in fact, distribution could explain their continued exis-
tence. To that end, this Part considers the much-debated laws
involving felony murder and the divergence between attempts and
completed crimes.122 Felony murder and attempt laws rest liability
on results (what Sanford Kadish calls the “harm doctrine”)123 and
118. This seems to reduce compensatory justice to retributivism. See Heidi M. Hurd,
Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 407 (2005) (asserting
corrective justice collapses into retributivism when it assumes that victims are “vindicated
if and only if their offenders receive their just deserts” irrespective of victim restoration).
119. Fletcher, supra note 99, at 52.
120. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 232 n.55 (observing that distributive reasoning
“applies a social criterion of fair wealth equilibrium independent of ... individual desert”).
121. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
122. This Article deliberately excludes statutory rape and public welfare offenses. Statutory
rape laws do not reflect distributive goals, but rather specific moral norms regarding sexuality
and family. See Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory:
Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691,
774-803 (2003). Public welfare offenses are not distributive because they generally do not
involve actual injury, see State v. Warfield, 80 P.3d 625, 628 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), and they
are usually justified by utilitarianism, see infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
123. Kadish, supra note 13, at 679. Although Kadish uses “harm doctrine” to describe
lessening liability for those who intend but do not produce harm, this Article uses the term
to describe any link between liability and unintended results. The “harm doctrine” is distinct
from John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle,” which limits government action to preventing harm.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978)
(1859). 
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are subject to the critique that individuals should not be punished
for “bad luck.”124 Although defenders of these laws offer various
justifications, many scholars simply write them off as irrational.125
A distributive rationale, however, appears to account fully for why
these laws continue to exist and thrive in modern times.126 
A. Felony Murder
The felony murder doctrine, which holds felons strictly liable for
deaths occurring during felonies, “is one of the most widely criticized
features of American criminal law.”127 Felony murder is not,
however, the only strict liability criminal law. There is a discreet
category of criminal laws called public welfare or regulatory of-
fenses that make defendants strictly liable for violations of govern-
ment regulations.128 These offenses originated during the industrial
revolution when federal legislation responded to the dangers
inherent in mass production of consumable goods.129 Lawmakers
reasoned that strict liability was appropriate given the particular
124. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
125. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 695-96; Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral
Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 238 (1994) (describing
opposition to the harm doctrine as “the standard educated view”).
126. Cf. John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291, 291
(1998) (asserting that lapses in the mens rea requirement demonstrate that criminal law may
not be about retribution).
127. Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 966
(2008) [hereinafter Culpability]; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 1 (1980) (observing
a lack of principled arguments in favor of the rule); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 83, at 1387
(noting “fifty years of sustained academic and judicial hostility” to the rule).
128. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283-84 (1943) (holding defendant
strictly liable for violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (holding defendant strictly liable for failing to comply with
pharmaceutical regulations). These crimes are also controversial. See, e.g., Richard Singer &
Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert
Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 902 (1999) (welcoming the end of strict liability regulatory
offenses); see also Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for
Mothers Under Failure To Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 618 n.207
(1998) (observing an unfavorable view of strict liability crimes).
129. See State v. Gilman, 291 A.2d 425, 430 (R.I. 1972) (noting strict criminal liability’s
connection to regulation of industries affecting “public[ ] health and safety”); Laurie L.
Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401,
419 (1993) (commenting that regulatory crimes responded to dangers of the industrial
revolution). 
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risks of widespread harm posed by industrialization,130 the diffi-
culty in proving negligence,131 and the de minimus nature of most
regulatory penalties.132 As a consequence, the driving rationale of
regulatory criminal law was utilitarian—to incentivize producers to
use extra care in manufacturing.133 Unlike regulatory offenses,
felony murder does not involve large numbers of injuries, and intent
is not especially difficult to prove.134 Moreover, far from imposing a
small regulatory penalty, application of the felony murder doctrine
may be the difference between life and death.135 Consequently,
felony murder is often considered a crime of more questionable
validity than public welfare offenses.136 
Strict liability is, by its nature, troubling to retributivists,137 and
thus much of the defense of felony murder has taken place on
distinctly utilitarian terrain.138 Utilitarians assert that the felony
130. United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (observing the
need to regulate dangerous devices and products); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
253-54 (1952) (remarking that the industrial revolution’s “wide distribution of harm”
necessitated “numerous and detailed regulations”).
131. See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of Strict
Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 393 (1989) (noting the argument that it takes too
much time to determine intent in regulatory cases).
132. The Model Penal Code and many lower courts permit strict liability only for
“violations” or minor offenses. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (1985); see United States v. Wulff,
758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the Supreme Court has not limited the
sentence that may be imposed for regulatory crimes. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
133. See DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 104, at 224 (maintaining that strict liability
protects the public by providing safety incentives). 
134. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 83, at 1385 (noting that felony murder prosecutors
could prove culpability); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A
Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1455 (1994)
(asserting that strict liability felony murder “is not essential to combat a widespread societal
threat”).
135. See Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 783 (1999) (“[U]nlike littering, felony murder can bring a death sentence.”).
136. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 695-97 (calling the rule “rationally indefensible”).
137. See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict
Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 88 (1990) (describing
strict liability as inconsistent with retributivism); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and
Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 64-65 (1986) [hereinafter Criminal
Responsibility] (observing that retributivists reject punishment for unforeseeable conse-
quences).
138. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV.
59, 131 (2004) (tracing the utilitarian argument to nineteenth-century theorists who saw the
rule “as a device for regulating dangerous activities”); Tomkovicz, supra note 134, at 1450
(stating that the “rule’s conflict with accepted culpability principles” creates need for
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murder rule produces two main deterrent effects: (1) it deters
potential criminals from committing felonies,139 and (2) it encour-
ages those who commit felonies to be careful.140 The criticisms of the
deterrence basis for the felony murder rule are legion. Many assert
that given how felons reason and the infrequency and randomness
with which deaths occur during felonies, there is little chance
that potential murder liability measurably affects incentives.141
Moreover, deterrence could be achieved more easily by increasing
felony penalties or creating a predictable measure of enhancement,
such as sentencing every tenth convicted felon to life,142 than by
placing felons on punishment “roulette wheels.”143
Randomly giving life sentences, however, would never likely
survive judicial or societal scrutiny.144 This indicates that nonutil-
itarian moral intuitions explain the resilience of the rule.145 In fact,
retributive accounts of felony murder have long existed. One of the
earliest retributive justifications of felony murder came in the form
of the “transferred intent” principle.146 The contention is that intent
to commit a felony transfers to any concurrent death, such that the
felon is presumed to have intended the death.147 This concept of a
deterrence justifications). 
139. See Fisher v. State, 786 A.2d 706, 732 (Md. 2001) (stating that the rule “is intended
to deter dangerous conduct”); Criminal Responsibility, supra note 137, at 64-65 (critiquing
this deterrence argument).
140. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (remarking that the rule’s
purpose is to deter negligent and accidental killings); Cole, supra note 78, at 97 (observing the
argument that the rule promotes caution during felonies). See generally Nelson E. Roth &
Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 450-53 (1985) (discussing deterrence arguments).
141. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 n.24 (1982) (citing a statistic that only 0.43
percent of robberies result in homicide); Roth & Sundby, supra note 140, at 452-53; Marcia
J. Simon, Note, An Inappropriate and Unnecessary Expansion of Felony Murder in Maryland,
65 MD. L. REV. 992, 1010 (2006) (asserting that “it is highly unlikely that commission of a
felony will result in death”).
142. See Criminal Responsibility, supra note 137, at 64-65 (maintaining that deterrence
could be achieved “more efficient[ly] by convicting every tenth felon of murder”).
143. See United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001) (approving a strict
liability sentencing enhancement as a “punishment bonus”). 
144. I say “likely” because, given the phenomenon of repeat offender statutes, many felons
are in an enhancement lottery. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975).
145. See Criminal Responsibility, supra note 137, at 65 (observing the rule’s “resilience”).
146. Transferred intent often describes the assessment of liability to one who intends a
crime, acts, and produces an injury, but the person injured was not the intended victim. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (2009).
147. See State v. O’Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798-99 (S.D. 1980) (stating that “general
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culpability “trigger” is disturbing to retributivists because not all
felons intend or even reasonably foresee death.148 Thus, experts
commonly dismiss such retributive accounts as ethically unsound.149
Nevertheless, there are more sophisticated retributivist justifica-
tions of the felony murder rule.150 Some argue that the rule appro-
priately condemns felons who negligently cause death for immoral
reasons.151 However, many formulations of the felony murder rule
plainly do not require negligence, much less ill will.152 Cases impose
murder liability when victims die of heart attacks,153 when police
shoot bystanders,154 when dealers sell drugs that cause overdoses,155
and in other situations that do not neatly fit in a negligence-plus-
motive paradigm.156 Others make a “practical retribution” argument
that strict liability is justified because most felony murderers
possess the requisite intent and to require mens rea risks exonerat-
ing some culpable killers.157 However, as noted before, intent to kill
malicious intent is transferred from [the felony] to the homicide”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
148. See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1110 (1997) (criticizing this “constructive culpability” where harm
“trigger[s]” culpability) (emphasis omitted). There is a related ideology that once a person
becomes a felon, he is perpetually culpable. See Gerber, supra note 135, at 782 (observing the
view that “no felon can possibly be innocent”).
149. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 135, at 770 (stating that transferred intent “contradicts
our most basic conception of proportionality”); Kadish, supra note 13, at 695-97 (calling the
transferred intent argument irrational).
150. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 148, at 1123-24 (justifying the rule by asserting that
felons should make “extensive efforts” to be careful).
151. Culpability, supra note 127, at 967 (defending an “expressive” theory that predicates
blame on “the actor’s expectation of causing harm” and “the moral worth of [his] ends”)
(emphasis omitted).
152. See Cole, supra note 78, at 126-27 (observing the argument that common underlying
felonies do not establish blameworthiness for murder). But see Culpability, supra note 127,
at 979 (calling such cases “sporadic”).
153. See, e.g., Klosin v. Conway, 501 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431, 442-43 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Miller
v. State, 512 S.E.2d 272, 274 (Ga. 1999).
154. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 153 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying a sentence enhancement to a drug
dealer for an unforeseeable drug user death).
156. See, e.g., Malaske v. State, 89 P.3d 1116, 1117 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (finding felony
murder liability appropriate when the defendant gave alcohol to his underage sister and the
sister shared it with her friend who drank excessively and died). Some cases predicate felony
murder on strict liability offenses. See, e.g., State v. Smoot, 737 N.W.2d 849, 850, 854 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007) (making strict liability DWI a predicate for felony murder). 
157. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 156
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is not particularly difficult to prove.158 Moreover, treating noncul-
pable defendants as sacrificial lambs in the quest for aggregate just
punishment seems fundamentally incompatible with Kantian
retributivism. Thus, the question remains whether there is a
deontological justification for the blanket felony murder rule. 
In answering this question, it is helpful to provide a brief
background to the concept of “moral luck.”159 There are tomes of
philosophical writing on this topic,160 but what follows is a truncated
discussion for the purpose of discovering a retributivist justification
for the harm doctrine. One of the strongest objections to the harm
doctrine is that it premises punishment on mere luck.161 Thus, it is
unacceptable to assess murder liability to a felon who engaged in a
relatively safe felony and encountered “bad luck” when the investi-
gating officer accidentally shot his partner, but assess only felony
liability to an armed robber who did not encounter resistance.162
Retributivism, however, regularly tolerates the operation of luck.
“Bad luck” certainly accounts for a portion of almost every convict’s
criminal disposition (termed “constitutive luck”),163 but retributivists
do not consider that adequate ground to deny criminal liability.164
(1997) (calling this “consequentialist” retributivism that regards “the guilty receiving
punishment as a good ... to be maximized”).
158. See Cole, supra note 78, at 97 (commenting that such reasoning supports “strict
liability throughout the criminal law”); supra note 134 and accompanying text.
159. See Russell Christopher, Does Attempted Murder Deserve Greater Punishment Than
Murder? Moral Luck and the Duty To Prevent Harm, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 419, 421 (2004) [hereinafter Luck and Harm] (describing the moral luck issue as
“whether, and to what extent,” luck is relevant to desert). Compare Joel Feinberg, Equal
Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad But Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 117, 121 (1995) [hereinafter Failed Attempts] (asserting that luck introduces
arbitrariness, which is “a bad thing in a legal system”), with Barbara Herman, Feinberg on
Luck and Failed Attempts, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995) (noting that “to say that luck
brings arbitrariness into the law is not yet to offer an argument”). 
160. This topic was popularized in philosophical literature by the famous essays of Thomas
Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993), and Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in, MORAL LUCK, supra at 35.
161. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 688 (asserting that fault cannot depend “on what is
beyond [one’s] control”).
162. See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1404 (2003) (maintaining that the
“rational” position is that without mens rea there is no difference between a felony murderer
and felon).
163. See Nagel, supra note 160, at 60 (defining constitutive luck as luck regarding “the kind
of person you are”).
164. See Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J.
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Luck regarding criminal opportunity (called “circumstantial luck”)165
is also generally palatable to retributivists. Circumstantial luck
occurs when two similarly intentioned actors produce different
results because one was presented with a criminal opportunity the
other was not. Holding the noncriminal actor less culpable is
acceptable to retributivists because there is always the possibility
that he would have acted lawfully had the criminal opportunity
arisen.166 
The difficult case of bad luck for retributivists is when two
defendants intend and act in the same manner, and luck is the only
factor leading to disparate results (“resultant luck”).167 In this case,
disparate results cannot be attributed to any different choices or
nonchoices made by the two defendants.168 Philosophers character-
ize the challenge as reconciling the obvious importance that law and
society attach to fortuitous results with the unimpeachable logical
mandate that luck should not matter.169 Many have responded to
this challenge with complex theories of liability and morality. The
arguments rationalizing moral luck from a seemingly deontological
standpoint appear to fall into three categories: proof, intuitionism,
1862, 1909 (2006) (observing that a killer “with bad ‘constitutive’ luck” is still seen to murder
“as an act of will”); Morse, supra note 13, at 367 (stating that the law treats people as
“intentional agents” and not “flotsam and jetsam of the causal universe”); cf. Meir Dan-Cohen,
Luck and Identity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 18-19 (2008) (“That one is who one is, is not
a stroke of good luck or bad.”). Some theorists critique retributivism for defining culpability
with reference to a discrete set of choices in a small pocket of time. See Darryl K. Brown,
Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1295, 1310 (2001) (criticizing criminal law for repressing “the reality of social influences” in
favor of a “shaky idea of free will”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kelman, supra note
46, at 592-96.
165. See Nagel, supra note 160, at 60 (describing circumstantial luck as luck regarding “the
kind of problems and situations one faces”).
166. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 690 (asserting that bad luck may lead you to “reveal[ ]
your badness” but “it is that choice for which you are blamed”).
167. See Luck and Harm, supra note 159, at 426-27 n.31 (observing the argument that
“only outcome luck is problematic”).
168. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 690 (stating that retributivism may tolerate “[f]ortuity
prior to choice” but not “fortuity thereafter”); Moore, supra note 125, at 237 (calling punishing
nonculpable harmers an “anathema” to moral philosophers).
169. See Nicholas Rescher, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 160, at 147; see also
Luck and Harm, supra note 159, at 421 (noting conflict between the “nearly universal
intuition” that results matter and the “seemingly unimpeachable argument” that people
should not be punished for bad luck).
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and instrumentalism. These arguments ultimately do not explain
the harm doctrine as clearly as distribution.
The proof argument holds that unintentional harm matters as
an indicator of the harmer’s moral comportment.170 This theory
hypothesizes a thin version of luck in which consequences are less
random than they appear.171 Judith Andre, for example, morally
differentiates the reckless driver who kills from the one who does
not on the ground that “[s]ome people persistently misjudge, and in
the process hurt other people. (We might call the agents ‘morally
accident-prone.’) They are malformed in some way; something
prevents them from correctly assessing the facts before they act.”172
Even if retributivists would accept being “morally accident-prone”
as sufficient for criminal culpability,173 there are lingering problems.
First, if results always indicate character, we must believe that the
spree killer whose stray bullet kills a terrorist about to detonate a
bomb (saving thousands) has by virtue of that result evidenced
something excellent in his character.174 Second, even if results have
some bearing on character,175 the criminal law unlikely recognizes
this attenuated connection as a basis for formal liability.176 
Both the intuitionist and instrumentalist arguments begin with
the recognition of a societal intuition to base blame on results.177
The intuitionist account of moral luck contends that society’s
170. See Judith Andre, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, 43 ANALYSIS 202 (1983); Norvin
Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 MIND 198, 201 (1986).
171. See Andre, supra note 170, at 207 (“We have more control over the kind of person we
are than we sometimes think.”); Herman, supra note 159, at 148 (asserting that luck should
not encompass “the normal or expectable range of independent (of our will), causally ‘live’
effects”).
172. Andre, supra note 170, at 205. 
173. See id. (conceding that the morally accident-prone “are neither blameworthy nor
punishable”); cf. Hampton, supra note 99, at 1661-66, 1698-1701 (characterizing harm-causing
as part of a bad character for which one is responsible). 
174. See Morse, supra note 13, at 384-85 (supporting moral condemnation of one whose
dangerous conduct “produces an entirely unintended and unforeseen benefit”).
175. But see id. at 411 (asserting that results are “misleading indicators of both risk and
mens rea”). 
176. See Andre, supra note 170, at 206 (distinguishing the “sense of diminished worth” from
causing harm from “moral fault”). 
177. See Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) (observing that “people’s punishment
judgments are guided” by psychological significance of harm); Nagel, supra note 160, at 69
(commenting that “our basic moral attitudes ... are determined by what is actual”).
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intuition invests results with moral content.178 However, as Joel
Feinberg remarks, “That the bulk of the people believe that a
particular proposition is true is a good reason, I agree, for tolerance
and respect. But it is not a good reason, even in a democracy, for
believing that proposition to be true.”179 Moreover, the purportedly
collective social intuitions favoring the harm doctrine may be based
on the feelings of crime victims and those sympathetic to them.180
Yet victims who suffer horrible injuries often react in ways that
they, themselves, in hindsight see as morally condemnable.181 As
one victim of the Oklahoma City bombings explained, “‘Victims and
family members are not dispassionate. We are angry, depressed,
and mourning.’”182 
Instrumentalist arguments regard the law’s recognition of societal
intuition as instrumentally important to some separate moral
scheme.183 Instrumentalist courts and scholars assert that diver-
gences between criminal law and social intuition lead to bad results
like widespread vigilantism and lack of public confidence in
government.184 Justice Stewart remarked in the death penalty
context that “there are sown the seeds of anarchy” when “people
begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve.’”185
However, a retributivist would plainly reject punishment of the
178. See R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 124 (1996) (noting that social intuition might
“express a deep[ ] moral vision”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 83 (1988)
(asserting that law should reflect the “sensibilities of common people”).
179. Failed Attempts, supra note 159, at 126; see also Morse, supra note 13, at 421-22
(arguing that social intuition does not mean “desert is independently attributable in part to
results”).
180. See Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1516 (denying that intuitions supporting the harm
doctrine have widespread appeal). 
181. One Oklahoma City victim stated that after the bombing he “‘wanted McVeigh and
Nichols killed without a trial’” and concluded that “‘victims are too emotionally involved in the
case and will not make the best decisions.’” S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON CRIME
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT, S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 82 (2003) [hereinafter CRIME VICTIMS’
RIGHTS AMENDMENT REPORT] (quoting Bud Welch). 
182. Id. (quoting Patricia Perry). 
183. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) (arguing that law should
“maximize its moral credibility” by reflecting “community intuitions of justice”).
184. See, e.g., HART, supra note 75, at 36-37; Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1511 (rejecting
that “official retaliation” is better than “mob violence”).
185. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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innocent to cater to society’s wishes.186 Instrumentalist arguments
also appear to prove too much and too little. Satisfying society’s
punitive demands could justify the imposition of punishment
whenever society demands it, whether or not the defendant pro-
duces harm. Conversely, society’s tolerance for crime might dictate
foregoing punishment of culpable harm-causers.
Many retributivists thus simply write off the social intuition to
blame for harm as mere inferential error, asserting that society
unreasonably equates unintentional harm with culpability.187
Nevertheless, a case could be made that society’s intuition to blame
when bad things happen is not arbitrary, irrational, or divorced
from morality, but a reasonable manifestation of society’s adher-
ence to distributive justice principles in a culture of legal individu-
alism.188 The distributive logic behind punishing unintentional
harmers is evident: there are two individuals involved in the
criminal incident—the innocently intentioned, unlucky defendant
and the innocent victim. The victim has been put in a deprived
condition by the event involving the defendant, and the legal
system’s role is to create a fair distributive balance between the
victim and criminal.189 The question might then arise of why society
supports alleviating victims’ suffering in a retributively problematic
way by punishing the nonculpable. The answer is that within the
current criminal law narrative, punishment of offenders is the
exclusive manner of providing relief to victims.190 
186. A consequentialist could argue that society becomes less stable when courts
doctrinalize vengeance. See Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1513.
187. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 100 (photo. reprint 1982)
(1759) (calling adherence to the harm doctrine “an irregularity in the sentiments of all men”);
Dripps, supra note 162, at 1388 (describing society’s linking culpability with unintentional
harm as a “fundamental attribution error”).
188. See James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial:
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5 (1995) (commenting that jurors’
“feelings of empathy can lead to helping”).
189. See Nadler & Rose, supra note 177, at 447 (discussing a study finding mock jurors
more lenient when victims were better able to cope); Tomkovicz, supra note 134, at 1471
(observing that victim injury “generates an inclination to respond” with payback).
190. See, e.g., Atonement, supra note 75, at 1844 (maintaining that victim restoration can
only be achieved by “vindicat[ing] the victim’s worth through punishment”); see also Susan
A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
10 (2009) (observing a “feedback loop” in which society promises victims closure and the
system is structured by that promise).
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Given that distribution is not the preferred discourse of criminal
law,191 or most law, there is a tendency to cover distributive
sentiments by claiming fault.192 Thus, courts examining felony
murder do not overtly mention the distributive basis of the rule,
preferring to rely on utilitarian reasoning, transferred intent, or
tradition.193 Nonetheless, some doctrinal developments underscore
that victimhood is key in assessing felony murder liability. There
is a line of cases holding that a defendant is not liable for felony
murder when a cofelon dies, even though he would have been liable
had an innocent been killed.194 Courts avoid justifying this rule by
overt reference to the comparative worth of felon and bystander
victims.195 However, the weak reasoning behind the division com-
bined with its popularity belie that the doctrine reflects the basic
view that felon-decedents should not receive distributive relief.196 
To be sure, considering the felony murder rule a matter of
distributive justice raises some inevitable questions. One question
is why a distributionist regime would accept the notion that death
is different. To answer, perhaps the fact that strict liability has not
been extended to felonies producing nondeath harms is just a
historical development with no clear connection to retribution,
utility, or distribution.197 However, there is a cogent argument that
the death-is-different idea is more easily rationalized by distri-
butionism than utilitarianism or retributivism. Utilitarians may be
confronted with the argument that it would be far more effective to
191. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 701 (contending that retributive instincts “run deep and
powerfully in our culture”).
192. See Ristroph, supra note 47, at 743 (noting that philosophical “rhetoric is available to
defend almost any ... punishment”). 
193. See supra notes 138-40, 146-47 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (Pa. 1958) (holding that the
police’s justifiable killing of a cofelon cannot engender murder liability). 
195. See, e.g., People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (“We do not ...
indulge in the fanciful theory that the victim being a felon assumed the risk.”).
196. Despite the ready criticisms, see, e.g., People v. Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Mich.
1963) (asserting that it is impossible to draw a logical distinction between accidental and
“justifiable” felony killings), courts widely implement this distinction, see People v. Raymer,
662 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Colo. 1983); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); Wooden
v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Va. 1981); State v. Brigham, 758 P.2d 559, 561
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(d)(ii) (West 2009) (creating an
exception for felony murder liability when a co-felon is killed).
197. Cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 134, at 1458 (opining that historical influence might explain
persistence of the rule).
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deter felonies by making felons strictly liable for nondeath harms
like destruction of property or injury. Empirically, these results
likely happen more often than death, and punishing for them would
more effectively shape incentives.198 As a retributive matter, if
fortuitous death indicates moral blameworthiness, then so should
other fortuitous bad results. 
By contrast, one could argue that death calls for a wholly different
distributive solution. When nondeath harms occur, a victim can feel
“closure” from punishing the felony alone, whereas when there is a
death, more punishment must be meted out to restore survivors to
an appropriate status.199 In addition, death may create a tipping
point between distributive and retributive sentiments. When victim
suffering is significant, society embraces distributive intervention.200
When harm is not great, society reverts back to fault instincts.201
Today, however, distributive sentiments are beginning to trump
culpability concerns in a variety of criminal cases, not just when
harm is at its zenith.202 In sum, it appears by all accounts that
retributivism fails to make sense of the felony murder rule, and
utilitarian defenses are internally contradictory and empirically
unsound.203 By contrast, the felony murder rule makes perfect sense
as a means of distributing satisfaction to harmed victims by im-
posing increased penalties on felons who cause deaths. 
B. The Attempt-Crime Divide
For decades, theorists have struggled to rationalize criminal
law’s mandate that two people who intend and commit the same
198. See supra note 141.
199. See Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 228 (2002) (noting that because murder
“cannot be ... compensated by monetary means,” closure focuses on punishment).
200. See Tomkovicz, supra note 134, at 1464 (observing the “evocative symbolic value” of
life).
201. There is also the question of why distributionist instincts have not led to all
unintentional deaths being charged as murder. To answer, distributive sentiments trump
retributive sentiments only when distribution burdens the socially disfavored, like felons. See
id. at 1474 (remarking that the public rejects holding innocents, but not felons, liable for
accidental death); infra Part IV.
202. See infra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
203. See Simons, supra note 148, at 1112 (noting that “retributivists have yet to give an
account of the acceptable dimensions of the moral luck ‘differential’”) (emphasis omitted).
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criminal acts should be treated differently because one completed
the crime but the other did not,204 sometimes called the “punishment
differential.”205 In fact, the preceding arguments involving moral
luck are most often set forth in the context of this conundrum.206 As
with felony murder, there have been many attempts to justify the
punishment differential by reference to utilitarianism and retri-
butivism. As in the felony murder context, these attempts have been
met with numerous objections.
The principal consequentialist justification of the punishment
differential is that punishing completed crimes more severely will
encourage attempters to abandon.207 However, “by the time the
defendant has done the substantial acts toward carrying out the
crime that the law of attempt requires, there is very little chance of
a change of heart.”208 Another suggestion is that the differential
incentivizes those who, for example, shoot victims to try to save
their lives.209 Yet it seems quite far-fetched that a shooter will try to
save his victim because he is afraid of the punishment differen-
tial.210 As a result, utilitarian justifications engender much skepti-
cism. This leaves the retributive argument that those who complete
crimes are more culpable than those who do not.211 As discussed in
detail in Part II.A, there are many theories positing the moral con-
204. Failed Attempts, supra note 159, at 117 (observing that “[e]very bona fide philosopher
of law tries his hand” at this conundrum).
205. See, e.g., Luck and Harm, supra note 159, at 419 (using the term “punishment
differential”); Morse, supra note 13, at 390.
206. See, e.g., Failed Attempts, supra note 159, at 117-21; Morse, supra note 13, at 363-66;
see also Ken Levy, The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm is Just as
Punishable as the Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 LAW & PHIL. 263, 267-68 n.7 (2005)
(citing articles on attempts and moral luck).
207. See Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1519 (discussing the argument that the divide
incentivizes “the actor to desist”). 
208. Kadish, supra note 13, at 687. 
209. See Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1519-20 (noting the argument that the punishment
differential creates an incentive to aid victims).
210. There is also the argument that without the differential, “an actor who has attempted
to kill, but has failed, would have no disincentive not to try again.” Luck and Harm, supra
note 159, at 420 n.7. But this is only true if the punishment for the attempt is not “a maximal
sanction.” See Marcelo Ferrante, Deterrence and Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 24-25
(2007). In addition, being lenient on attempters “could tend to decrease deterrence.”
Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1521; see also DUFF, supra note 178, at 122. 
211. See Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One,
88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 792 (2000) (arguing that the “real challenge” is providing deontological
justification for the punishment differential).
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tent of apparent luck, but these ultimately prove unsatisfying.212
The question becomes whether there are other deontological argu-
ments that explain the attempt-crime divide.
One plausible way to rationalize the divide from a retributive and
utilitarian standpoint is by concentrating on the “substantial step”
requirement.213 Attempt law divides movements toward crime into
preparatory acts that do not engender liability and substantial steps
that bear a legally sufficient relationship to the completed crime.214
The trend in criminal law has been toward characterizing acts quite
removed from completed crimes, like reconnoitering, as substantial
steps. Thus, the vast majority of attempts are not cases in which the
crime certainly would have succeeded had resultant luck not
intervened.215 Retributivists, in turn, should have little trouble
differentiating most attempters from completers because, as noted
before, an actor who has not made any choice is less blameworthy
than one who has made an immoral choice.216 From a utilitarian
perspective, persons whose attempts are far from completion are
less dangerous and require less deterrence.217 
Of course, this set of arguments does not directly respond to the
hypothetical as framed by theorists, which necessarily involves
identical defendants only separated by the “luck of the draw.”218
Nonetheless, there is a practical retribution argument here: it
would be patently unjust to treat most attempters the same way
212. See supra notes 159-86 and accompanying text.
213. See United States v. Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009)
(asserting that there must be “a substantial step towards committing the crime” (quoting
United States v. Sarbia, 367 F.3d 1079, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2004))) (emphasis omitted); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985) (stating that attempt requires “a substantial step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime”).
214. See United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 998 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A substantial step
goes beyond ‘mere preparation’ but may be less than the ‘last act necessary.’” (quoting United
States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Smith, 264 F.3d 1012,
1016 (10th Cir. 2001).
215. See Herman, supra note 159, at 144 (maintaining that “not all attempts are like the
shooting case (two shooters, two victims; one success, one failure due to the unexpected
intervention of a mosquito)”).
216. See DUFF, supra note 178, at 119-20 (commenting that retributivism supports less
punishment for “incomplete attempts”).
217. See Morse, supra note 13, at 389 (noting that “[m]ost preparatory conduct is not itself
terribly dangerous or immoral”).
218. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 679.
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as completers, so attempts should be punished less.219 In order to
protect the many whose attempts are farther back on the time-
line, the law gives a free pass to the few who have taken the last
step.220 Of course, a straightforward retributive solution to the
punishment differential would be to grade steps along the pre-
paration-to-completion timeline.221 Today, courts resolve the pun-
ishment differential problem by unilaterally increasing penalties
for attempts.222 
The practical retribution argument, however, will not convince
Kantians that the attempt-crime divide is morally defensible.
Moreover, there is still the question of why, in the hypothetical case,
people believe that the completer is more blameworthy. In addition
to moral luck arguments, there are some deontological defenses of
the divide that concentrate, not on the difference in wrongdoing, but
on the difference in the warranted punishment.223 Some scholars
assert that although similarly situated attempters and completers
are equally culpable, the fact that their results diverged impacts due
punishment. Because the completer has benefitted from reaching
his goal and the attempter has not,224 the completer should suffer a
greater deprivation.225 However, as an empirical matter, a murderer
219. See Morse, supra note 13, at 387; Daniel Ohana, Desert and Punishment for Acts
Preparatory to the Commission of a Crime, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 113, 113-14, 131 (2007)
(contending that blame is deserved only when the defendant “has succeeded in finalizing his
preparations”).
220. See Ohana, supra note 219, at 131 (maintaining that in the law of attempt, “[o]nly a
rough approximation is possible”).
221. Cf. Samuel Kramer, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal
Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 410
(1990) (making a utilitarian argument for grading attempts).
222. See Morse, supra note 13, at 379. This might explain politicians’ desires to eliminate
the harm doctrine from attempt law despite their support for it elsewhere. 
223. Some argue that the completer is more blameworthy because he chose not to render
aid, whereas the attempter was never faced with the choice. See, e.g., Luck and Harm, supra
note 159, at 424. But this would not justify the differential when the completer tries to aid or
aid cannot be rendered.
224. See HART, supra note 75, at 131; Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less
Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAW & PHIL. 1, 29 (1986) (“The successful murderer has
the advantage of having done what he set out to do.”).
225. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 201 (2009) (positing that retributivists grade punishment according to offenders’
subjective experiences of pain); Morse, supra note 13, at 426 (noting the argument that the
completer “has gained more and should receive more blame and punishment to right the
moral ledger”). 
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may suffer agonizing remorse, whereas an attempter may ex-
perience feelings of relief that produce great joy. Moreover, most
thoughtful retributivists reject predicating punishment on the
offender’s subjective experience because of the perverse implica-
tions.226 
Thus, the question remains why people think that equally
culpable completers and attempters should be treated differently.227
The attempts to explain this intuition by appeals to utilitarianism
or retributivism are not extremely persuasive. By contrast, as a
distributive matter, it is perfectly rational to treat completers and
attempters differently.228 The remedial requirements attendant to
actual victimhood simply do not exist when the attempter has not
produced harm. When there is no victim, there is no one to whom to
distribute pleasure, and a different judicial response is warranted.
To summarize, this Part has analyzed two criminal law doctrines
traditionally considered troubling from retributive and utilitarian
perspectives to uncover their distributive bases. Scholars often
criticize the attempt-crime distinction as nothing more than the
irrational premising of liability on bad luck. A distributive rationale,
however, explains the social intuition that, with all other things
equal, completers should be more liable than attempters. The
distributive theory is perhaps most clearly underscored by the
felony murder rule. The most straightforward explanation for the
no-fault rule is that it permits criminal courts to create a desired
distributive arrangement. Analyzing these classic criminal law
antinomies reveals a glimmer of the distributive purpose of criminal
law. This distributive justification has blossomed into an important
basis for punishment in modern times.
226. See Kolber, supra note 225, at 219-35 (discussing objections to subjectivizing
punishment). There is also the argument that “if postcrime satisfaction is a genuine moral
desert criterion, it should be applied to all criminals.” Morse, supra note 13, at 427.
227. See Herman, supra note 159, at 146 (noting the possibility “that what interests us
about attempts has no bearing on moral blameworthiness”).
228. See Cole, supra note 78, at 113 (noting that the differential may be explained by
“increased public demand for retaliation when harm results”).
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III. DISTRIBUTIONIST SENTIMENTS UNDERLIE MODERN PENOLOGY
For the greater part of the twentieth century, victims’ distributive
interests were clearly subsidiary to defendants’ fault and rehabilita-
tive potential.229 That began to change in the 1960s when rising
crime rates and increasing media coverage made crime a hot-button
political issue.230 Over the next two decades, a confluence of factors,
including rapid social changes, reaction to Warren Court progressiv-
ism, increases in capital flows, and new race relations, fueled a
reactionary politic of crime and punishment.231 The tough-on-crime
political platform emerged with President Nixon’s declaration of a
war on crime232 and rose to prominence during the presidency of
Ronald Reagan, who used crime as the prime example of welfare’s
failure.233 Because punitive reform carries political force,234 it has
remained a dominant message despite partisan changes in govern-
229. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 187 (2008) (noting that
until the late twentieth century, rehabilitation was the primary sentencing goal); supra notes
88-92 and accompanying text.
230. See Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Pain: A Political Institutionalist Analysis of Crime
Victims’ Moral Protests, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 619, 625 (2007) (attributing the public attitude
to increasing crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s). But see KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME
IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5-8 (1995) (tracing public fear to media exaggeration, not crime rates). 
231. See GARLAND, supra note 89, at 57; Feld, supra note 90, at 1462-1505 (discussing
factors leading to the shift in penological views in the late 1960s through the 1980s); Angelina
Snodgrass Godoy, Converging on the Poles: Contemporary Punishment and Democracy in
Hemispheric Perspective, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 515, 529 (2005) (observing that
“conservatives ... refram[ed] the crime issue from a question of inadequate social welfare to
one of insufficient social control”).
232. See Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 8, 12
(Jan. 22, 1970).
233. See Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriff’s Association in
Hartford, Connecticut, 1 PUB. PAPERS 884, 885 (June 20, 1984) (attributing crime rates to “a
liberal social philosophy that too often called for lenient treatment of criminals”); Rape and
Feminism, supra note 29, at 620 (commenting that in this era, “[h]orrendous criminals became
... invaluable as examples of why there should be ‘no tolerance’ for people’s ‘poor excuses’”
(quoting Brown, supra note 28, at 6)); Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 70 (noting that Reagan and Bush waged several rhetorical wars on crime).
234. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005)
(observing the “strong incentive to add new offenses and enhanced penalties”).
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ment.235 Today, crime control is “one of the few forms of domestic
governance defensible within [conservative] political ideology.”236 
Tough-on-crime proponents waged their rhetorical campaign on
three fronts: reforming the dialectic of retributivism, emphasizing
deterrence and incapacitation, and introducing penal distribution.
Political discourse of crime and punishment highlighted the desert
component of retributivism and minimized its limiting principle of
proportionality.237 As a result, criminals could be seen as perpetu-
ally responsible and deserving of any amount of punishment.238 At
the same time, crime control advocates portrayed incapacitation
and deterrence as necessary in a world rife with random violence.239
Finally, if desert and utility could not justify ratcheting up pun-
ishment, politicians were quick to rely on distributive justice to
victims.240 
235. See, e.g., William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 567, 568 (1995) (signing the harsh
crime bill and remarking that “[t]here must be no doubt about whose side we’re on”); Bruce
Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of Mass
Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2009) (noting Democrats’ support for “punitive
criminal justice policy”).
236. Jonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism,
17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 853, 854 (1999) (book review); see also Eva S. Nilsen, Decency,
Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 114 (2007) (“America, through its courts, has ‘gotten tough’ on
crime.”).
237. See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 811, 812 (2002) (lamenting that retributive rhetoric has justified a criminal “system of
quarantine”); Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 255-56 (asserting that retributive rhetoric “has
tended to sponsor extreme policies and practices that thoughtful retributivists themselves
might well renounce” (quoting Atonement, supra note 75, at 1839)). 
238. See Feminist War, supra note 33, at 768-69 (“Retributivism, as articulated during the
war on crime, stood for the principle that the general, undifferentiated criminal element was
constantly culpable to the highest degree.”).
239. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 414 (commenting that rehabilitation has been replaced
by incapacitation); Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1418 (2002) (noting that the “dominant” penal ideology reflects
“nineteenth-century notions of simple deterrence and elimination through exclusion or
execution”).
240. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 34, at 192 (“To maintain its fever pitch of
hatred, the war on crime needs ever more, and ever more sympathetic, victims.”); Feminist
War, supra note 33, at 769-70 (noting that “the tragedy of the victim” sustained tough-on-
crime ideology).
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This Part will describe the rise of the distributive argument for
criminalization in modern times, as manifested through popular
discourse and legal doctrine. To that end, it will begin by discussing
the victims’ rights movement’s paradigm of just punishment. Next,
it will examine the proliferation of the harm doctrine in criminal
law as evidenced by sentencing reforms and victim impact law. 
A. Distribution in the Victims’ Rights Movement
The victims’ rights movement is the term given to various
interests groups, active over the past thirty years, that have
coalesced around the principles that the criminal law is inade-
quately attentive to victims’ needs and the particular remedies
should be increased victim participation and harsher punish-
ments.241 Some of the original victims’ rights supporters were
feminists concerned with the criminal system’s treatment of rape
and domestic violence victims.242 The victims’ rights movement,
however, rose to prominence during the tough-on-crime era, and it
gained popularity, not by denigrating criminal justice as sexist,
241. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission’s
Obligation To Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 567 (2002)
(observing that “[v]ictims demanded a greater role in the criminal justice system, asked for
better treatment, and also sought higher penalties”); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in
American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 6 (1999) (describing
victims’ rights as “a political movement, fueled by grassroots campaigns of concerned citizens”
and savvy politicians). There are numerous articles discussing this movement. See, e.g.,
Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How Prosecutorial and
Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised To Silence Victims Who Oppose Capital Punishment,
15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 451-52 (2004); Barker, supra note 230, at 619; Douglas Evan
Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 289, 289-92; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects
of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1375-76; Aya Gruber, Victim
Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an
Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 666 (2003); Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting
Compassion: The Federal Victims’ Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 590 (1998)
[hereinafter Co-Opting Compassion]; Henderson, supra note 32, at 937-38; Jon Kyl, Steven
J. Twist & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephenie
Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV., 581, 583 (2005); Wayne A. Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age
of Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 721, 760 (2008) [hereinafter Confronting Evil].
242. See Barker, supra note 230, at 626 (noting that the early victims’ rights movement
included “unlikely coalitions made up of radical feminists [and] conservative ‘law and order’
groups”); Demleitner, supra note 241, at 567 (remarking that feminists were early victims’
rights supporters).
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but by calling for more exacting punishment of paradigmatically
violent criminals.243 As a consequence, although the movement may
not have originated as a right-wing faction dedicated to enhancing
punishment severity, the victim increasingly became the primary
justification for ever harsher criminal laws.244 Today, the victims’
rights movement positions victims’ rights in opposition to defen-
dants’ constitutional rights and explicitly embraces conservative
anticrime policies.245 Advocates have been successful in establish-
ing victims’ bills of rights in every state,246 with provisions ranging
from limiting the exclusionary rule247 to retrenching the insanity
defense.248 One of the movement’s most visible achievements has
been to establish victim impact statements as essential evidence
during sentencing.249 
On the surface, the term “victims’ rights” invokes a liberal rather
than a distributionist paradigm.250 Although rhetorically about
243. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 876 (2000) (commenting that conservatives were
more successful at characterizing rape as a problem of predators than feminists were at
characterizing rape as an issue of inequality); Rape and Feminism, supra note 29, at 622-24
(arguing that victims’ rights rhetoric thwarts feminist reform). 
244. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 841 (2001) (stating that the “war on crime
is fueled by images of [vengeful victims] of horrific crimes”); Co-Opting Compassion, supra
note 241, at 590 (remarking that since the beginning of the victims’ movement, society has
gravitated “towards harsher and longer punishments”). 
245. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 951 (observing the “conservative bent” of the current
victims’ movement); Thad H. Westbrook, Note, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South
Carolina Responds to Victims’ Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (1998)
(describing victims’ rights as a counter to Warren Court reforms).
246. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9402 (2010). According to the National Center for Victims of Crime, “[e]very state has a set
of legal rights for crime victims in its code of laws.” See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
ISSUES: VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=Document
Viewer&DocumentID=32697 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
247. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(2) (“[R]elevant evidence shall not be excluded in
any criminal proceeding.”); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 28
(1982) (asserting that when “the ‘criminal goes free because the constable blundered,’ the
victim is denied justice” (quoting People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926))) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). 
248. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a)-(b) (West 2010) (abolishing the diminished capacity
defense and replacing the permissible ALI rule with the restrictive M’Naghten rule).
249. See infra Part III.B.2.
250. See John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 689-90
(2002) (calling the victims’ movement “one of the most successful civil liberties movements”);
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rights, victims’ rights ideology bears little relation to the small gov-
ernment principles most of its conservative supporters otherwise
espouse.251 Conservatives generally differentiate “real” rights from
mere interests in welfare.252 They endorse a Lockean analysis of
rights as being appropriately about protections against govern-
ment action (“negative rights”), not access to government benefits
(“positive rights”).253 In this view, the right to private property is a
real right, whereas with the right to education, the word “right” is
a misnomer for a welfare scheme of government-funded education.254
Of course, critics have long noted the incoherency of attempts to
draw an objective line between rights protection and distribution.255
For example, protecting property calls upon a vast legal regime to
uphold the property owner’s financial interests against competing
interests.256 Nonetheless, it is not necessary here to explode the
difference between rights and distribution, because the victims’
cf. Feminist War, supra note 33, at 776 (arguing that “[t]he group, ‘victims,’” has not been
“systematically subordinated by society”).
251. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., supra note 24; see also Social Citizenship, supra note 26, at 787 (asserting
that conservatives characterize “rights to economic security as ‘redistribution’” to render them
“suspect”). 
253. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (MacPherson ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1980) (1690); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122-34 (1969) (using this
terminology).
254. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause
“cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State”); Craig Scott &
Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in
a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1992) (noting the conservative
belief that constitutions should incorporate rights to “freedom from state intervention, not
rights which place positive obligations on the state”); cf. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249
(N.C. 1997) (finding the North Carolina Constitution provides a substantive right to
education). 
255. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 389 n.7 (1984) (contending that “rights theory does not provide an objective,
apolitical basis for decisionmaking”); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1058-59 (asserting
that the legal decisions cannot be “rationally justified” by the “inherent logic of rights”); supra
notes 47-48.
256. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding that using state court processes
to enforce racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action); cf. Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 361 (1980) (arguing that property is “merely a bundle of legal
relations”).
44 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:001
rights movement is not about negative rights and minimizing
government. 
Victims’ rights rhetoric is about allowing victims to compel
government action.257 Victims’ “rights” are actually demands that
the state enable greater victim participation,258 order financial com-
pensation,259 eliminate defense-friendly rules that impede convic-
tions,260 and ensure “adequate” punishment.261 The last demand in
this list particularly underscores the unusual way rights are
described in the victims’ rights movement. The victim has a “right”
to the government punishing the defendant.262 Victims’ rights
discourse calls on the government to engage with victims—to restore
their dignity, ensure their satisfaction, and value them—in short,
to give them their “due.”263 And as one commentator notes, people
are “said to have ‘their due’” when they “receive what they should
according to the purpose and the criterion of a given distribution.”264 
Not all victim advocates support the model of benefitting the
victim through defendant suffering. Restorative justice theorists
257. Some victims’ rights laws do protect alleged victims from invasive investigation
techniques. See Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2006) (mandating
“respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy”). However, “[b]ecause prosecutors undervalue
victims’ privacy,” the victims’ rights movement adopts an agenda “on which prosecutors and
victims can agree: longer sentences and fewer procedural protections for defendants.” Tom
Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1396 (2005).
258. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-832(f) (2003) (requiring the prosecution to obtain the
victim’s views about case disposition); ALA. R. EVID. 615(4) (exempting victims from the rule
against witnesses); ARIZ. R. EVID. 615(4) (same); see John W. Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence:
The Victims’ Right that Influences Criminal Trials, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 231, 236-37 (2001)
(noting that the purpose of Reagan’s 1982 Task Force on Victims’ Rights was to make victims
“active participant[s] in the criminal justice system”).
259. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.2-105 (2009).
260. See Daniel E. Lungren, Victims and the Exclusionary Rule, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
695, 697 (1996) (arguing that a system that prioritizes defendants’ rights over victims’ desire
for retribution “has lost its sight and soul”); supra note 258. 
261. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(a)(5) (giving victims the “right to expect that persons
convicted of committing criminal acts are sufficiently punished in both the manner and the
length of the sentences imposed”).
262. See id. (granting victims “the right to expect that the punitive and deterrent effect of
custodial sentences imposed by the courts will not be undercut or diminished by the granting
of rights and privileges to prisoners”); Henderson, supra note 32, at 986 (observing that
victims’ rights policies “appear[ ] to assume that a victim has a right to a conviction”).
263. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the
CVRA puts defendants and victims “on the same footing” and restores victims’ dignity); see
also supra note 257.
264. Benson, supra note 102, at 536.
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centralize the role of the victim but underscore the curative value
of forgiveness, dialogue, and relationship building.265 In the ideal
restorative justice world, offenders and victims profit from partici-
pating in proceedings that promote healing.266 Like social programs
that seek to increase rather than divide “the pie,” restorative justice
seeks to increase pleasure for victims and offenders, not utilize the
criminal law to distribute the scarce resource of pleasure between
them. Unlike restorative justice supporters, the victims’ rights
movement maintains that victims receive closure through par-
ticipating in proceedings as defendants’ adversaries and seeing
defendants punished.267 
Victims’ groups demand influence over the criminal process and
elimination of defense-friendly substantive and procedural laws.268
They indict current law for unfairly subordinating victims’ interests
to defendants’ procedural protections and call for a more satisfactory
balance.269 One might assert that within the liberal framework, it
265. See generally Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1, 3-4 (discussing various definitions of restorative justice); Symposium,
Restorative Justice in Action, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (2005).
266. See, e.g., Kathy Elton & Michelle M. Roybal, Restoration, A Component of Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 43, 51 (“The restorative approach ... takes into account the needs of the
offender.”); Marsha B. Freeman, Love Means Always Having To Say You’re Sorry: Applying
the Realities of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Family Law, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 215, 226-27
(2008) (asserting that therapeutic programs benefit victims, offenders, and society).
267. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(a)(2) (“Victims of crime are entitled to have the
criminal justice system view criminal acts as serious threats to the safety and welfare of the
people of California.”); VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 34, at 167 (observing that
restorative justice has “not been embraced by the [punitive] victims’ rights movement”);
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation To Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1273-81 (1994) (critiquing restorative justice for undervaluing
victims’ desire to express anger); supra note 190.
268. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(4) (specifying as a victim’s right that “[a]ny prior
felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall
subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of
sentence”); Russell P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need To Know Regarding Crime
Victims’ Participatory Rights in Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 21, 24
(2006) (approving of a law that gives “victims the opportunity to review [presentence reports]
and to argue for enhancements”); Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights? The
Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 157, 170 (1992) (noting that the movement seeks to “make it easier” to arrest
suspects, order pretrial detention, change evidence rules to favor prosecution, and keep
convicts in jail by limiting judicial review).
269. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 7296 (2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (urging passage
of the CVRA because “the scales of justice are out of balance”); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON
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is acceptable for the government to deprive a person of something
he obtained in a wrongful fashion.270 Certainly, it is popular for
victim supporters to claim that defendants do not deserve rights.271
However, even if certain defendants are ultimately guilty, they
cannot be said to have wrongfully obtained rights. 
Instead, the liberal argument for reconfiguring the procedural
balance must rely either on a “practical retribution” argument272
that procedural rules privilege the guilty more than they protect the
innocent273 or the utilitarian claim that their costs outweigh their
benefits.274 In this view, changing the procedural balance is not
distributionist but an independent retribution or utility-maximizing
policy shift that only coincidentally benefits victims. This means,
however, that defendants should have fewer procedural rights in all
cases, not just ones involving victims. In turn, victims are material
only if one assumes they have expertise on how to configure the
system’s procedural balance.275 The rhetorical thrust of the victims’
rights message is not so much that victims have expertise on the
retributively appropriate procedural balance, but that changing
the procedural balance vindicates victims’ interests in healing
VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT, supra note 247, at 114 (finding that the justice system lost
its “essential balance” by disserving victims). 
270. See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1911
(2007) (observing the libertarian view that government protection only extends to “justly
acquired” things). 
271. See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 622 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting the view of New
York Assembly members that “sex offenders did not deserve [constitutional] protection”); Co-
Opting Compassion, supra note 241, at 582-83 (asserting that the movement contrasts guilty
defendants who are “undeserving” of legal protection with victims who are “‘deserving’ of
rights”).
272. See supra notes 157, 219 and accompanying text.
273. See Akhil Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 644
(1996) (criticizing the exclusionary rule for giving guilty defendants “windfalls” but providing
no remedy to innocents); Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule Be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310, 326 n.57 (1993) (claiming that the exclusionary rule is a “distortion
of retributive justice” because the guilty “go[ ] undenounced”).
274. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce rule violation because its social costs outweigh its
deterrence benefits).
275. See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1434 (1993) (noting
that victims assert expertise based on their experience); cf. CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS
AMENDMENT REPORT, supra note 181, at 85 (quoting a bombing victim as stating, “we usually
lack expertise and have a desire for vengeance that we claim is the need for justice”).
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through participation and punishment.276 In sum, the victims’ rights
movement is deeply distributionist in its explicit message, the struc-
ture of its arguments, and the reforms it supports. The increasing
focus on victims’ interests combined with the prevalent trend of
describing crime in victimhood terms277 has had a profound effect on
current criminal law’s treatment of unintentional harm. 
B. Distribution in Criminal Law Reform
Very few scholars deny the influence of the victims’ rights move-
ment on the current state of criminal law.278 Today, the centrality of
harm and decreased role of mens rea is not reflected merely in a
couple of troubling criminal law quandaries. Rather, it is manifest
in many areas of criminal law. Victim-focused ideology is pushing
the law toward eliminating different culpability standards for
juveniles279 and the mentally ill.280 Moreover, harm is currently an
explicit basis for punishment in any case in which it has been
produced.281 Parts III.B.1-2 address two areas of sentencing law
exemplary of the distributive theory of criminal law.
276. See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
277. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 172 (1999) (noting the emphasis on “harms to society” during the war on
drugs) (emphasis omitted). 
278. See Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of
Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 144 (1999) [hereinafter Past
Darkly] (calling victim impact evidence law the “most prominent” achievement of the victims’
rights movement).
279. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 9151 (2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (stating that “16-
and 17-year-olds are making adult, criminal decisions that equal tragedy for our neighbors”).
See generally Feld, supra note 90, at 1522-23 (discussing how “conservative politicians ...
demonized young people”); Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile
Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107 (2009).
280. See Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 61-62
(2005) (observing that between 1980 and 2004, fifteen states restricted the insanity defense);
Feminist War, supra note 33, at 781 (remarking that today “schizophrenic and psychotic
defendants ... are routinely characterized as culpable, autonomous agents of crime”).
281. See Andrew Nash, Note, Victims by Definition, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1419, 1436-37 (2008)
(observing that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) further victims’ rights by “calibrating”
sentences to victim harm).
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1. Sentencing Reform
In the sentencing context, courts have openly come to embrace
the argument that unintentional and unforeseeable results con-
stitute valid bases for punishment.282 Many cases uphold strict
liability sentencing provisions on the bare ground that “sentencing
is different.”283 Some courts unflinchingly impose strict liability on
the basis of textual statutory interpretation of sentencing guide-
lines,284 whereas others rely on weak philosophical justifications.285
As with the classic criminal law quandaries, retributivists and
utilitarians struggle to find appropriate justifications for strict
liability sentencing provisions.286 This, combined with the structure
of sentencing guidelines and the manner of their interpretation by
courts, indicates that distributive sentiments lay at the heart of the
sentencing shift.
The federal sentencing guideline revolution in the 1980s was
perhaps the single most important development signaling the rise
of harm and the decline of culpability in penal law.287 The guide-
lines formally link sentence length to harm, requiring judges to
add penalty points whenever harm-based sentencing factors are
282. Some courts say that the sentencer should account for victim harm as it evolves. See,
e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2006) (asserting that the
sentencer must consider victims’ conditions “at the time it makes its decision”).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Griffiths, 41 F.3d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A distinction is drawn between strict liability
crimes and strict liability enhancements.”).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Williams, 49 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (basing a strict liability interpretation of USSG
§ 2K2.1(b)(4) on congressional intent).
285. See United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding a strict
liability provision as a sentencing “bonus”); United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 453 (3d
Cir. 1992) (asserting that strict liability provisions comport with retributivism and
utilitarianism because guidelines are “offense-based”).
286. Some courts justify strict liability provisions on the ground that the defendant should
have exercised super care. See, e.g., Griffiths, 41 F.3d at 846 (asserting that a firearm
recipient has “the burden of ensuring that the firearm is not stolen”); Mobley, 956 F.2d at 456.
However, these individual crimes are not hazardous industrial crimes for which super care
is appropriate. See supra note 50. 
287. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 69 (2003)
(observing that while harm-based adjustments may increase a probation sentence to life,
culpability-based adjustments “rarely contribute more than two to four levels”). 
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present.288 The guidelines’ starkest indication of the centrality of
harm is the “relevant conduct” provision, which holds defendants
accountable for “all harm that resulted from” any “acts and omis-
sions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.”289 In many sentenc-
ing provisions involving harm, including the relevant conduct
provision, the guidelines are silent on intent.290
Through the creation of guidelines, policymakers hoped to re-
form what both Liberals and conservatives considered arbitrary
and inconsistent sentencing practices.291 The U.S. Sentencing
Commission sought to distill the main factors affecting judicial
decision making and produce a formula for applying those factors
to individual cases.292 Although its origins may seem neutral, the
guideline revolution coincided with the conservative political
movements discussed above and accordingly formalized higher than
average sentences293 and incorporated the concept that harm should
dictate punishment level.294 The result is that the federal guidelines
did not produce uniform sentences but did make sentences uni-
formly longer.295 
288. The USSG make physical injury a mandatory sentencing factor in crimes such
as “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking,” U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2009), and “Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an
Unlawful Alien,” id. § 2L1.1. For economic crimes, the USSG list financial harms without
reference to intent, but make death and serious bodily injury relevant when defendants
impose a “conscious or reckless risk.” See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(13)(A), 2B5.3(b)(5)(A).
289. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
290. See id.; supra note 288.
291. See Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1361-62
(1999) (book review) (noting the bipartisan support for the USSG).
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006) (creating the Sentencing Commission to “provide
certainty and fairness”).
293. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the USSG significantly increased average sentences for white collar crimes); Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1128
(2008) (observing that the USSG “provide for more [departure-based] increases than
decreases”). 
294. See Nash, supra note 281, at 1436 (observing that the USSG impose heavier penalties
for crimes involving victim harm); supra notes 288-89; infra note 304.
295. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science
of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005) (characterizing the USSG as
“a one-way upward ratchet”); Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky
Corrections—Aftershocks of a “Tough on Crime” Philosophy, 93 KY. L.J. 305, 318 (2004)
(asserting that the USSG “proved to be less about correcting disparities” than increasing
sentence severity (quoting Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:
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It is true that in the pre-guideline era, judges routinely based
sentences on unintentional (and even unproven) harm for a variety
of reasons. Judges likely reasoned that the harm was probably
intentional,296 but there is also the possibility they acted to serve
victim interests.297 The common law permitted judges to sentence
defendants to anything within the statutory range for any consti-
tutional reason, rendering sentencings more like cases in equity.298
As the sole meter of fairness, the judge could mete out pure retri-
bution, send a deterrent “message,” or create a distributive balance
between the parties.299 
Rather than abandon equitable considerations when construct-
ing sentencing law, the federal guidelines discarded some and
formalized others. The guidelines prohibit consideration of equitable
factors that make the defendant a good candidate for less punish-
ment despite apparent culpability, like disadvantaged upbringing,300
and relegate others, like age, health, and family circumstances, to
the status of extraordinary downward departures.301 It does ring of
retributivism to hold that, absent an extraordinary circumstance,
A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts on the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9
(2003))).
296. See Judge J. Phil Gilbert, Plenary Session III: The Nature and Severity of Punishment
for Economic Crimes, Symposium on Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New
Technology Offenses (Oct. 12, 2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2000sympo/ePlenaryIII.
pdf (stating that loss is the best measure of culpability). 
297. See Henning, supra note 279, at 1143 (“Victims’ reactions ... may elicit sympathy that
motivates judges to impose harsher sentences.”).
298. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (holding that because judges have
discretion in punishment, they should possess “the fullest information possible”).
299. See id. at 247-48 (observing that the judge’s goal may be retribution, reformation, or
rehabilitation).
300.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2006) (noting “the general inappropriateness of considering
the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and
community ties of the defendant”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 (2009)
(deeming irrelevant a defendant’s “[l]ack of guidance as a youth” or “disadvantaged
upbringing”); id. § 5H1.10 (prohibiting consideration of socioeconomic background). 
301. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (“Age (including youth) is not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.”); id. § 5H1.6 (“[F]amily
ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining ... departure.”); Hofer &
Allenbaugh, supra note 287, at 70 (observing that “[e]conomic hardship, drug addiction, a
history of physical or sexual abuse, or a lack of guidance as a youth—for many, highly
relevant to assessing an offender’s culpability—are ignored by the Guidelines”); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1953-54 (1988) (asserting that the USSG virtually eliminated personal
background as a sentencing consideration).
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the culpable should be punished. But this particular embrace of
retributivism served to increase punishment and was thus consis-
tent with victims’ interests.302 Equitable considerations that mili-
tated toward more punishment despite nonculpability, like victim
injury, were not rejected as inconsistent with retributivism.303 They
became mandatory sentencing factors.304 
The federal sentencing guidelines explicitly distinguish their
guiding principles from “the principles and limits of criminal lia-
bility.”305 Courts have accordingly interpreted guideline provisions
that premise punishment on injury as strict liability provisions,306
with some courts creating a presumption of strict liability.307 Courts
often justify such decisions as textually compelled and simply elide
the question of the propriety of premising punishment on uninten-
tional harm.308 Of course, this interpretive move is itself telling. If
courts adhered to the purely retributive concept that culpability
must accompany punishment, they would likely interpret the
guidelines as requiring some level of intent or foreseeability.309 In
302. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A) (making “intended loss,”
which includes “impossible” losses, the measure of harm only when greater than “actual loss”);
Hessick, supra note 293, at 1157 (positing that the USSG consideration of prior bad acts but
exclusion of prior good acts may be based on concern for victims). 
303. See Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 613-14 (2003) (asserting that
retributivism “does not offer any obvious rationale” for harm-based sentencing provisions).
304. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A2.2-4, 2A4.1, 2A5.1, 2A6.2, 2B3.1
(adding points for victim injury); supra notes 288-89. The USSG also contain a discretionary
upward departure for “significant physical injury.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K2.2.
305.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt. n.1.
306. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) (approving an
upward departure for “significant physical injury” although the defendant lacked intent);
United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding robbery defendant
strictly liable for victim injury); United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding a drug conspirator responsible for unforeseeable drug deaths); United States v.
Reeder, 170 F.3d 93, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1999) (counting harm unintentionally caused by a third
party).
307. See United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Sentencing
enhancements generally are imposed on the basis of strict liability.”); Mitchell, 366 F.3d at
379; United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
308. See United States v. Litchfield, 986 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1993) (imposing strict liability
because a provision “did not contain a knowledge requirement”); supra note 284 and
accompanying text.
309. See Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 146-57 (2000) (noting that courts impose
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the 2005 case United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that
the federal guidelines must be discretionary rather than manda-
tory, but this did not diminish the importance of harm in sentenc-
ing.310 The Court struck down mandatory guidelines, not because
they premised punishment on unintentional harm, but because they
violated the right to a jury.311 Moreover, post-Booker law continues
to bind judges to the guidelines to some degree,312 and many judges
simply elect to follow them.313 
2. Victim Impact Evidence Law
Perhaps the doctrine that most clearly reflects the new distribu-
tive paradigm in criminal law is the law of victim impact evidence.
In the 1991 case Payne v. Tennessee,314 the Supreme Court reversed
prior precedent315 and held that prosecutors may present and
comment on victim impact evidence during death sentencing
proceedings.316 Victim impact evidence is comprised of live witness
testimony,317 documentary evidence,318 and even multimedia pres-
entations319 that describe the decedent’s life and the impact of the
death on surviving victims.320 Prior Supreme Court precedent ruled
strict liability on the basis of textual interpretation although the text is ambiguous and
congressional history does not clearly support strict liability). 
310. See 543 U.S. 220, 226, 244 (2005).
311. See id. at 226, 229, 233-34 (stating that the USSG would be permissible if advisory).
312. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007) (admonishing district courts to
begin with the guideline calculation and stating that appellate courts may presume the
reasonableness of guideline sentences).
313. See Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279, 280
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/104.pdf (“The statistics show that judges usually
stick to the sentences provided in the Guideline grid.”).
314. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
315. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 504 (1987) (barring use of impact evidence at death sentencing).
316. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
317. See id. at 814 (decedent’s mother’s testimony).
318. See Coddington v. State, 142 P.3d 437, 453 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (pre-death photo
of decedent).
319. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 567-68, 572 (Cal. 2008) (video montage of photos and
video clips of decedent’s life set to music). The video is available on the Supreme Court’s
website, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/media/media.aspx.
320. See Past Darkly, supra note 278, at 156 (observing that impact evidence relates “to the
personal characteristics of the victim and the ‘emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s
family’” (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827)).
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the admission of such evidence unconstitutional because it im-
permissibly allowed the jury to base death sentences on arbitrary
factors unrelated to defendant culpability.321 Much of Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Payne reflects the notion, discussed
above, that harm counts during sentencing because sentencing is
different.322 The Court stated, “Victim impact evidence is simply
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about
the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a
general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”323 The
Court responded to the contention that sentencing should be about
culpability, not by linking unintentional harm with culpability, but
by pointing to the felony murder doctrine and the attempt-crime
divide as evidence that criminal punishment does not invariably
require culpability.324 
The majority also grappled with the claim that impact evidence
invites juries to base sentences on the victims’ perceived worth.325 In
response, Justice Rehnquist defended impact evidence as “designed
to show instead each victim’s uniqueness as an individual human
being, whatever the jury might think the loss to the community
resulting from his death might be.”326 He went on to say that the
significance of the victim impact statement is to demonstrate that,
regardless of personal failings or achievements, the victim is “a
murdered human being.”327 Of course, the natural retort is that the
jury does not need impact evidence to know that a murder victim is
“a murdered human being.” Moreover, if “uniqueness” is not about
worth, then every victim is equally worthy and evidence of unique-
ness is irrelevant.328 Thus, one is left to wonder—if impact evidence
321. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (holding that victim impact “may be
wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant”).
322. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 820.
323. Id. at 825.
324. Id. at 819. The Court stated that “two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may
be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.” Id.
325. Id. at 823 (noting Booth’s concern that juries punish more harshly when “victims were
assets to their community”); cf. Gill v. State, 300 S.W.3d 225, 231, 233 (Mo. 2009) (holding
capital defendant’s counsel ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of victim’s possession
of pornography).
326. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
327. Id. at 824.
328. See id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that each of us is unique is a
proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support.”).
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does not relate to the defendant’s culpability or the victim’s worth,
what is the point of its admission?
The answer becomes clear when looking at the case from the
perspective of the victims’ rights movement. Victims’ rights sup-
porters lauded Payne as a great victory329 for two primary reasons:
First, the very process of expressing rage and pain is claimed to
bring closure to surviving family members.330 Second, the evidence
is undeniably compelling, and its introduction is likely to increase
the chances of a death sentence, which victims presumptively
desire.331 
Turning to the first, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence underscores
the process-based closure rationale. She opined that by admitting
impact statements, courts could “give back” to victims.332 Closure
through participation is a distributive notion because it dictates the
reconfiguration of procedures to secure victims’ psychic benefits at
the cost of defendants’ interests.333 Turning to the second, although
some have argued that victim participation does not necessarily
cause detriment to defendants,334 the victims’ rights movement and
victim impact law generally assume an adversarial relationship.335
329. See id. at 867 (noting that given the popularity of the victims’ rights movement,
“today’s decision will be greeted with enthusiasm”); Jose Felipe Anderson, When the Wall Has
Fallen: Decades of Failure in the Supervision of Capital Juries, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 768
(2000) (observing that victim groups “heralded” Payne as a victory).
330. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some Thoughts About Survivor Opinion
Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 537 (2003) (calling “the potential
therapeutic effect” the “best argument” for impact evidence); Past Darkly, supra note 278, at
150-51 (observing the “asserted psychological value to survivors of having a chance to testify
(and emote) about their loss”).
331. See Confronting Evil, supra note 241, at 759 (commenting that impact evidence gives
prosecutors a “strategic litigation advantage”); Minow, supra note 275, at 1416 (noting the
“calculated judgment” that impact evidence causes sentencers to “sentence more stringently”).
332. Payne¸ 501 U.S. at 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
333. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (distribution and procedure).
334. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 611, 636 (2009) (rejecting that impact evidence is “a ploy to more harshly punish
defendants”). 
335. See Martha Minow, Keynote Address: Forgiveness and the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1394, 1400 (2000) (contending that the purpose of impact evidence is “to provide vivid
statements of pain and harm caused by horrific acts, not to permit forgiveness”); Robert P.
Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort To Recast the Battle
in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1710 (1997) (asserting the victims’ movement
considers “[m]ercy to the guilty [as] cruelty to the innocent” (quoting SMITH, supra note 187,
at 88)).
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While admitting victims’ statements of anger and anguish, courts
continue to prohibit victims from advocating against the death
penalty.336 As one expert opines, “[N]either the victims’ rights
community nor the Supreme Court generates or tolerates narratives
in which victims’ families can exercise mercy, kindness, or forgive-
ness towards defendants.”337
The most obvious consequence of the admission of impact
evidence is that it “encourage[s] jurors to decide in favor of death.”338
The majority opinion appears to endorse this outcome in its
reciprocal fairness argument.339 The Court asserted that if defen-
dants may present mitigating evidence to avoid a death sentence, it
is only “fair” that prosecutors be able to present impact evidence in
favor of a death sentence.340 In his dissent, Justice Stevens re-
sponded that to say “fairness requires that the State be allowed to
respond with similar evidence about the victim ... is a classic non
sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or
bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or a mitigat-
ing circumstance.”341 As a matter of retributive justice, it makes
little sense to balance the evidentiary scales between defendant and
victim.342 
336. E.g., Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that Payne
does not require admission of “the opinion of a victim’s family member that the death penalty
should not be invoked”); see Baird & McGinn, supra note 241, at 468 (contending that
antideath penalty victims’ “desire[s] to affect the prosecutorial process is ignored”).
337. Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 28 (2000).
338. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 856 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Paul
Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAW’S
STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 135, 141 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996) (commenting that impact evidence “almost always” increases the chance of a death
sentence). 
339. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (opining that Booth “unfairly weighted the scales in a
capital trial”).
340. Id. (lamenting that despite the lack of limits on mitigating evidence, the state may not
offer “‘a quick glimpse of the life’ which a defendant ‘chose to extinguish’” (quoting Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))). 
341. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital
Defendant Who Wants To Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse
of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 737 n.148 (2006) (opining that “‘moral force’
can only be the sentiments ... that impel the desire to punish with death”).
342. Payne, 501 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that there is an evidentiary
balance because the prosecution may present aggravating, and rebut mitigating, evidence).
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As a matter of creating the appropriate distributive balance
between the victims’ need for closure and the harm of a death
sentence, it makes perfect sense.343 The majority candidly endorses
admitting impact evidence in order to allow the prosecution to
capitalize on “the full moral force of its evidence”344 and remind the
jury that victims “are, or were, living human beings, with something
to be gained or lost from the jury’s verdict.”345 Consequently, Payne
is directly responsive to victims’ interest in participation and
punishment. So much is recognized by Justice Scalia’s statement
that Payne’s rejection of the notion that “a crime’s unanticipated
consequences must be deemed ‘irrelevant’” reflects “a public sense
of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide
‘victims’ rights’ movement.”346 
Post-case developments underscore that Payne is about the
distribution of pain and participatory closure, rather than an
opinion based on the unanalyzed instinct that “harm matters” or the
presupposition that defendants foresee a range of harms.347 Today,
prosecutors seeking the death penalty do not just present the
arguably foreseeable effects of death on family members; they
introduce evidence regarding community opinion,348 highly inflam-
matory descriptions of decompositions and burials,349 and even
carefully crafted videos portraying the victim from childhood
through adulthood.350 The undertone of all these strategies is to
343. See id. at 863 (asserting that Payne allows sentencers to make “ad hoc” decisions).
344. Id. at 825 (majority opinion).
345. Id. at 826; see also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(contending that sentences may be based on “human suffering the defendant has produced”
and “not moral guilt alone”).
346. Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 405 (1996) [hereinafter Empathy]
(“Victim impact statements are billed as encouraging empathy for the victim.”).
347. Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that the “foreseeability of
the killing’s consequences imbues them with direct moral relevance”); see also John H. Blume,
Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 267
(2003) (remarking that almost all death penalty jurisdictions authorize impact evidence and
argument).
348. See Past Darkly, supra note 278, at 158 n.96 (citing cases admitting evidence of
victims’ standing in the community).
349. See id. at 165 (discussing a case in which the court admitted evidence “that the
children were buried in the same caskets as their mothers”).
350. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 567-68, 572 (Cal. 2008); supra note 319 and
accompanying text. See generally Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 566-67 (2008) (Stevens,
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remind the jury that it can vindicate victims’ interests (both living
and dead) by imposing the death penalty.351 Exemplary is one case
in which the decedent’s family was permitted to implore the jury to
“[r]enew our faith in the criminal justice system and bring a phase
of closure to this ongoing nightmare that fills our lives.”352 Indeed,
at least one scholar has recognized that Payne has a progressive
valence because it introduces personal narrative into the legal
process and encourages contextual, equitable, case-by-case decision
making.353
In conclusion, conservative tough-on-crime ideology ushered in
an era in American penal law and policy in which victim harm
plays a central role. In popular politics as well as case doctrine,
victims’ interests now stand alongside and even trump concerns
over retributive fault and social utility. Despite being couched in
terms of liberal rights, the change in the criminal law is at its core
distributionist. Increasingly, victims’ rights advocates and other
legal actors treat sentencing as a means to balance the amount
of retributive or utilitarian punishment due to the criminal with
the amount of closure demanded by her victim. As noted in the
Introduction, however, the dominant political ideology in the late
twentieth century was decidedly antidistributive. In tort law,
distributive strict liability rules take a clear back seat to negligence
and claims of moral fault and economic efficiency. In popular
politics, condemnation of redistribution and “socialism” resonates
with the public. Part IV posits an explanation for the rise of dis-
tributive reasoning in criminal law despite its profound unpopular-
ity in other spheres.
J., commenting on the denial of certiorari) (noting that courts have admitted “testimony from
friends, neighbors, and co-workers in the form of poems, photographs, hand-crafted items,
and—as occurred in these cases—multimedia video presentations”); Blume, supra note 347,
at 268 (observing the “overwhelming trend” of “unfettered admission” of impact evidence);
Past Darkly, supra note 278 (analyzing a variety of impact evidence).
351. See Confronting Evil, supra note 241, at 735-36 (discussing a sentencing in which the
prosecutor called impact evidence the “‘most important’” aggravating factor, which helps
jurors “‘understand the pain, the horror and the agony’” suffered by victims’ families (quoting
Trial Transcript at 6677-78, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR 1023 (S.D.N.Y. May
30, 2001))). 
352. People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 1109, 1124 (Ill. 1998).
353. Gewirtz, supra note 338, at 142-43; see Empathy, supra note 346, at 392 (discussing
the claim that impact statements possess “progressive, pragmatic, and feminist” attributes).
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IV. POWER, POLITICS, AND DISTRIBUTION’S FATE
This Part explores reasons for distribution’s proliferation in
criminal law and simultaneous decline in popular politics and pri-
vate law.354 Today, many of the same people who philosophically
reject wealth redistribution and vocally call for tort reform to stamp
out its few distributive areas also support government-imposed
harsh punishment of offenders to “make victims whole.”355 There is
a simple explanation for this apparent contradiction: power. In
the late 1970s and 1980s, recessionary concerns, rapid urban-
ization, public dissatisfaction with Supreme Court progressivism,
and other cultural and political factors combined to create a
hospitable environment in which hyper-individualist antidistri-
butionist sentiments could flourish.356 This environment shaped
political discourse on private law and criminal justice, which in turn
served to reshape the social context.357 The result is a cyclical
relationship between popular cultural beliefs and dominant political
354. See White, supra note 29, at 809 (observing retrenchment of the social welfare system
and growth of the criminal system).
355. The 1994 Republican “Contract with America” consisted of a package of ten bills,
including: 
2. The Taking Back Our Streets Act: An anticrime package including stronger
truth-in-sentencing, “good faith” exclusionary rule exemptions, [and] effective
death penalty provisions .... 3. The Personal Responsibility Act: Discourage
illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers and
denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, cut spending
for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision with work
requirements to promote individual responsibility .... [and] 9. The Common
Sense Legal Reform Act: “Loser pays” laws, reasonable limits on punitive
damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless tide of
litigation. 
The Republican Contract with America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.
html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Contract with America]. See Anne E. Kornblut,
Revisiting ‘00 Part of Strategy for Bush in ‘04, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting
that of George W. Bush’s “four-issue strategy” in the 1994 governor campaign, three were
crime, welfare, and tort reform).
356. See CHARLES W. DUNN & J. DAVID WOODARD, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN
AMERICA 10 (1996) (“While supply-side economics occupied the headlines [in the 1980s], the
social agenda galvanized individual allegiances to Reagan and the Republican Party.”); supra
notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
357. See White, supra note 29, at 819-26 (observing that market conditions sustain carceral
policies, which in turn reinforce neoliberal structure). 
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ideology and policy.358 In this setting, policymakers seek to both
create law that reflects pre-existing sentiments and configure law
to entrench values that undergird their political platforms.359
Distributionist criminal law is currently popular because enacting
policies in the name of crime victims serves distinct political
interests and reflects and reinforces the existing social structure.360
In the tort context, right-leaning ideology rejects strict liability
rules that facilitate wealth transfer to injured workers, environmen-
tal victims, and others.361 For the past few decades, tort reform, that
is, changing the law to minimize tort litigation, has been one of the
mainstays of the political right.362 Reigning in tort liability serves
corporate, moneyed interests,363 and its costs are borne by plaintiffs
who, unless well organized, have little power.364 That tort victims
hold little political sway is evidenced by the fact that it is the
plaintiff’s bar, not victims’ groups, who constitute the most powerful
358. See Kerry Dunn & Paul J. Kaplan, The Ironies of Helping: Social Interventions and
Executable Subjects, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 344-45 (2009) (remarking that individualism
undergirds tort reform ideology and tort reform reinforces “hegemonic individualism”).
359. See Rape and Feminism, supra note 29, at 621 (linking the current “discourse of
criminality” to “efforts to entrench neoliberal individualist values”); supra notes 230-40 and
accompanying text (popularity of punitive policies).
360. See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text. 
361. See William A. Dreier, Beyond Workers’ Compensation: Workplace Comparative Fault
and Third-Party Claims, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 464-65 (2003) (noting that “conservative
commentators favor a negligence standard”). One might counter that strict products liability
flourished in the conservative 1990s. However, experts observe a current “counterrevolution”
where product liability’s “paradigm of social welfare has been turned into an indictment of
tort law and a justification for abandoning the system.” Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 716
(1993). Others trace this exceptional phenomenon to “the very presence of the Third
Restatement.” Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement,
and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 936-37 (2005).
362. See Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class
Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
899, 899 (2008) (describing tort reform and tracing its ideology to corporate groups in the
1970s); supra note 355.
363. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 472-73 (2006) (linking tort reform to lobbying efforts of the American
Tort Reform Association, which includes powerful physician, manufacturing, and insurance
groups); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-
Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 656 (2008) (noting the claim that tort reform is “a product
of powerful corporate interest groups and a campaign of disinformation”).
364. See Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
345, 375 (2006-07) (asserting that despite the power of plaintiffs’ lawyers, victims “cannot
organize themselves into a force for change”).
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opponents of tort reform.365 Tort reform’s rhetorical strategy in-
cludes exploiting popular antidistribution ideology and asserting
that government should not force corporations to give handouts to
plaintiffs who should have been more careful.366
In the criminal law context, punitive policies and rhetoric are
powerful political weapons.367 For policymakers, being generally
tough on crime perpetuates social conditions that only inure to their
political benefit. Not only do victim-friendly provisions garner
popular support, but when criminal law is strengthened, the group
that loses is a subclass with very little political power.368 Supporting
crime control initiatives is especially rewarding for conservative
politicians because increasing felony convictions leads to the dis-
enfranchisement of those who, if they chose to vote, would likely
vote for progressive candidates and policies.369 Substantively,
criminal rules serve to entrench the prevailing class and wealth
structure.370 Because strengthening the carceral state has political
benefits, politicians abandon the minimal government, hyper-
individualism, antidistribution rhetoric in their defense of crime
control. Instead, they assert that serving crime victims’ needs is
indispensible to the fair, moral, and compassionate administration
of justice.371 Antidistribution sentiment becomes relevant only when
365. See id.; cf. Feit, supra note 362, at 899 (observing that plaintiffs’ lawyers and
consumer groups have had “mixed success” at countering tort reform).
366. See, e.g., Session Three: Discussion of Paper by George L. Priest, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2329, 2337 (1989) (statement of George L. Priest) (criticizing products liability law for
“presum[ing] consumers are powerless to avoid the injury”); see also Dunn & Kaplan, supra
note 358, at 344 (contending that tort reformers and the media “endorse ‘individual
responsibility’ as a bedrock feature of American culture”).
367. See supra notes 230-40 and accompanying text.
368. See Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD.
85, 102 (2004) (noting the argument that “legislators know that felons rarely vote and hence
the cost of appearing ‘tough’ on crime is low”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution
of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 794-95, 806-07 (2006).
369. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the
Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004) (noting that felony
laws disenfranchise “more black men ... than were actually enfranchised by the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment” and citing a study that had Florida ex-felons voted in 2000, Al Gore
would have won by more than 31,000 votes). 
370. See Kelman, supra note 46, at 670-71; see also White, supra note 29, at 789
(contending that criminal law “reflect[s] and advance[s] the institutional and ideological
interests of economic elites”).
371. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 18,084 (2005) (statement of Sen. Craig) (stating that victims
“deserve our support and compassion, not to mention our insistence on an aggressive law
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opposing defense-friendly provisions that seek to insert defendant
background into the criminal law equation.372 When such policies
are at stake, tough-on-crime advocates return to the mantra that
law is about bright-line determinations of fault and not distributive
fairness.373
However, one might find curious society’s support of the counter-
intuitive notion that it is unjust to hold faultless corporations liable
for money damages374 but fair to subject faultless human beings to
incarceration.375 Society’s views make more sense, however, if one
understands them as a function of specific politicized characteriza-
tions of those that reap the benefits and bear the burdens of
distribution in tort and criminal law. Social science confirms time
and time again that individuals’ assessments of fault and harm are
largely conditioned by the level of identification they feel with
alleged injurers and victims.376 Viewing the suffering of another
human being may produce in an observer the desire to give that
person relief, but it also may produce anger (if the observer blames
the person for his own suffering) or pleasure (if the observer believes
enforcement”); 151 CONG. REC. 6510 (2005) (statement of Rep. Poe) (“It needs to be reinforced
as a culture that ... we will be compassionate toward [victims], and we will make sure that
criminals who commit crimes against them will pay.”); see also supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text (fairness argument).
372. See, e.g., Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriff’s Association in
Hartford, Connecticut, 1 PUB. PAPERS 884, 885 (June 20, 1984), available at http://www.
reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/publicpapers.html (asserting that the “liberal” argument
that crimes are “caused by a lack of material goods, an underprivileged background, or poor
socioeconomic conditions” created “a class of repeat offenders and career criminals who
thought they had the right to victimize”).
373. See Dunn & Kaplan, supra note 358, at 343 (remarking that “individualism manifests”
in criminal law rules that deem a defendant’s social background irrelevant); Co-Opting
Compassion, supra note 241, at 588 (observing the prevalent view that introducing
background is “a manipulative ploy by wrongdoers to avoid individual moral responsibility”).
374. See 141 CONG. REC. 11,449 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (calling for tort reform to
“address this ‘lottery mentality’ of awarding arbitrary ... damages”).
375. See Simons, supra note 148, at 1098 (maintaining it would be unthinkable to hold a
tortfeasor “who save[d] his boat at the expense of a dock in the midst of a storm” criminally
responsible). However, today “punishing harm contributes to the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system.” Significance of Causing Harm, supra note 10, at 737.
376. See Robert E. Lane, Self-Reliance and Empathy: The Enemies of Poverty—and of the
Poor, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 473, 478 (2001) (observing that “[t]he explanation of a victim’s plight
... influence[s] the observer’s desire to help”). By identification, I mean both empathy, which
involves “imagining oneself to be in the position of the other,” and sympathy, which “involves
being flooded with emotion” on behalf of another. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987) [hereinafter Legality and Empathy].
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the person deserves suffering).377 A crime victim’s suffering triggers
society’s desire to provide relief and, in turn, to demand government
intervention.378 The desire to improve the conditions of the crime
victim’s existence effectively trumps inconsistent retributive and
utilitarian concerns.379 
Society’s empathetic tendencies, and hence society’s under-
standing of victimhood and suffering, do not exist in a vacuum, but
are formulated in complicated ways by cultural narratives, social
consciousness, politics, and law.380 Political scientist Robert Lane
identified two particular factors that affect observers’ assessments
of individuals’ claims of victimhood: (1) the individual’s level of
responsibility,381 and (2) the extent to which the observer perceives
the individual as similar to her.382 Antiwelfare groups have long
employed the strategy of exploiting racial animus and demonizing
or other-izing individuals who benefit from welfare programs to
defeat distributive policies.383 Racialized narratives conjure up
“stereotypes assigned to blacks, namely being ‘lazy, criminal, [and]
irresponsible,’”384 and thus serve the dual purpose of establishing
welfare recipients as dissimilar and undeserving. These narratives
377. See Lane, supra note 376, at 478.
378. See supra text accompanying note 5.
379. See supra notes 202, 287-95 and accompanying text. The question is why, given that
“[a]s potential injurers, we each have a fundamental interest in liberty,” and “[a]s potential
victims, we each have a fundamental interest in security,” society values only tortfeasors’
liberty. See Keating, supra note 53, at 196. 
380. See Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Narratives of the Death Sentence: Toward a Theory of
Legal Narrativity, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 552 (2002) (observing “how morality is
constructed at the intersections of experiential, institutional, and historically specific
identities”).
381. Lane, supra note 376, at 475-80. 
382. Id. at 483-84; see also Empathy, supra note 346, at 399 (“We feel empathy most easily
toward those who are like us.”); Fleury-Steiner, supra note 380, at 560 (reporting that death
sentencing jurors “emplot[ ] stories of their own experiences” when “evaluating the defendant’s
responsibility”).
383. See Martin Gilens, “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 593, 602 (1996) (observing that “[a]lthough blacks represent only 37 percent of welfare
recipients, perceptions of black welfare mothers dominate whites’ evaluations of welfare”);
“Welfare Queen” Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51
(discussing Reagan’s publicizing of a black female who engaged in welfare fraud to attack the
welfare system). 
384. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 795
(2007) (alteration in original). She further notes that “[g]overnmental assistance is not treated
as welfare when the recipients are considered to be blameless,” but blacks are not “viewed as
blameless.” Id.
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are so powerful that they move people not only to vote against the
general social interest, but also to vote against their own inter-
ests.385 The constructed image of “lazy” black welfare “queens,” for
example, moved many poor white Americans to vote for reforms that
cut their own benefits as well.386 
The use of stereotype and caricature is not just a conservative
strategy.387 The current debate over healthcare reform often
manifests as a battle of narratives. Democrats seek to paint the
insurance industry as a monstrous conglomeration of evil, greedy
corporations that gleefully inflicts pain on ordinary Americans.388
The conservative counterattack, however, has not largely been to
defend insurance companies. The most visible criticism has not
even been the expected argument about healthcare quality. Rather,
healthcare reform opponents have focused on a subsection of
potential recipients who are foreign or racially other and therefore
undeserving of healthcare.389 Accordingly, one of the most prevalent
assaults on healthcare reform is that “illegal aliens” will benefit.390
385. See Thinking with Wolves, supra note 25, at 1292-93 (explaining that conservatives’
exploitation of cultural insecurity explains why “non-wealthy white American voters lend
support to [a] political agenda that advocates spending more money incarcerating people of
color than securing most Americans’ access to high-quality public education”).
386. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 433
(2009) (contending that “tacit appeals to racial prejudice” may “convince ordinary citizens to
resist redistributive efforts that would have benefited whites”).
387. See Hubbard, supra note 363, at 481 (observing that “[t]he political opponents of tort
reform have adopted methods similar to those of proponents,” including “arguing in terms of
‘rights of victims’”). 
388. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S9070, S9072 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Brown) (reading into the record letters from uninsured individuals and quoting a doctor who
stated, “I see the abuses [patients] suffer at the hands of the greedy insurance companies”);
155 CONG. REC. S7809, S7810 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Reid) (stating that
voting against reform supports “greedy insurance companies”).
389. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H13,257, H13,263 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Akin) (asserting that “you’ve got illegal immigrants that come to this country and they’re
going to get health care”); 155 CONG. REC. H12,367 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Poe) (“Once again, Americans will continue to pay for illegals who disrespect the law.”).
390. See Mark Murray, NBC Poll: Doubts over Obama Health Plan: Misperceptions Abound
on President’s Health Overhaul Initiative, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/32464936/ (reporting a poll in which a majority of respondents expressed concerns
that illegal immigrants could access healthcare); Tony Reid, Area Residents Fed Up with
Illegal Immigration Take It to the Street, HERALD-REVIEW.COM, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.
herald-review.com/news/local/article_cf5d1816-d2b0-11de-afb9-001cc4c002e0.html (reporting
on a protestor who stated that “he doesn’t believe the president” and thinks reform “will give
illegal immigrants another way to drain American tax dollars”). It was this issue that
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This charge is so powerful that Democrats have underscored its
substantive validity by swearing that undocumented immigrants
will not be covered.391
Given the factors Lane highlights, one might expect people to
identify with innocent injured tort victims. Tort reformers certainly
publicize the widespread “problem” of juries acting on sympathy and
awarding wildly high damage awards when “evil” corporations
injure “little” plaintiffs,392 although whether this actually occurs is
a matter of empirical dispute.393 Reformers accordingly attack
depictions of corporations as evildoers and the tort plaintiff as the
innocent everyman and offer a separate account.394 They construct
and publicize a script involving lazy, careless tort complainants and
their greedy lawyers exploiting the deep pockets of socially utile
corporations.395 Although corporations rarely play heroes in even
tort reform narratives,396 they are portrayed as easily exploitable,
fragile, and indispensible to economic growth and security.397 Recall
compelled Republican Congressman Joe Wilson to shout “You lie!” during President Obama’s
address to Congress. See Joe Wilson Says Outburst to Obama Speech “Spontaneous,”
CNN.COM, Sept. 10, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/10/obama.heckled.speech
/index.html [hereinafter Outburst to Obama Speech]. 
391. See Outburst to Obama Speech, supra note 390; see also Remarks by the President to
a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care Reform, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 4 (Sept. 9,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-president-to-a-
joint-session-of-congress-on-health-care/ (stating that “[t]he reforms I’m proposing would not
apply to those who are here illegally”).
392. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 3
(1995) (asserting that for tort reformers, “juries are the apotheosis of irrationality,
incompetence, and injustice”).
393. See Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957,
964-76 (2007) (disputing the claim that punitive damages have been increasing in frequency,
amount, and randomness); see also VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 36 (2000) (engaging in a qualitative study and finding that “jurors
often doubt plaintiffs’ claims”).
394. See infra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.
395. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 20,119 (2004) (statement of Rep. Norwood) (warning about
“judicial hellhole[s],” “frivolous civil lawsuits,” and “greedy trial lawyers”).
396. Tort reformers have an easier time painting doctor-defendants as innocents. See 141
CONG. REC. 11,449 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (defending medical malpractice reforms and
mentioning the “heroic service of the doctors in the aftermath of the bombing in Oklahoma
City”).
397. See, e.g., The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, in Contract with America, supra note
355 (stating that the “dramatic growth in litigation carries high costs for the U.S. economy”).
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the famed McDonald’s hot coffee lawsuit,398 which became the iconic
example of all that is wrong with tort litigation, and its plaintiff,
Stella Liebeck, the archetype of a phony victim.399 The case contin-
ues to shape views about tort victims even though debunking facts
have demonstrated that Ms. Liebeck was far from a money-hungry
swindler.400 Within tort reform discourse, the victim is the fully
responsible immoral party, and the defendant requires protection
from an irrational, even socialist, legal system set on violating the
defendant’s rights in the name of redistribution.401 
The popular criminal law narrative is arguably the polar opposite.
War-on-crime discourse has effectively cemented the character-
ization of defendants as evil, fully responsible enemies upon
whom no amount of government punitive effort may be spared.402
To complement the image of the perpetually culpable offender,
tough-on-crime rhetoric emphasizes ultimately innocent victims.403
In fact, politicians often choose to publicize cases in which victims
are definitionally not responsible, in particular, violent crimes
involving small children.404 This casts the criminal trial as a moral
contest between blameless victims and evil, individually responsible
398. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests. P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
399. One website gives out “Stella Awards” to “outrageous” plaintiffs. See Stella Awards,
www.stellaawards.com; see also RANDY CASSINGHAM, THE TRUE STELLA AWARDS: HONORING
REAL CASES OF GREEDY OPPORTUNISTS, FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS, AND THE LAW RUN AMOK (2005).
400. These include the fact that Liebeck suffered third-degree burns over 6 percent of her
body; that she offered to settle her claim for $20,000; that McDonald’s produced documents
of 700 burn complaints; and that McDonald’s policy required coffee to be served at 185
degrees, although average home coffee temperatures are between 135 and 140 degrees. See
The ‘Lectric Law Library, The Actual Facts About the McDonalds’ Coffee Case, http://www.
lectlaw.com/files/cur78.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2010); see also Michael McCann et al., Java
Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 119-26 (2001) (discussing the
case).
401. See McCann et al., supra note 400, at 132 (observing that news coverage parallels “the
simplistic tort tales circulated by tort reformers”). There is evidence that this type of narrative
affects jury behavior as well. See Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards,
65 A.B.A. J. 68, 69-70 (1979) (finding that jurors exposed to advertising about a litigation
crisis awarded lower damages).
402. See Tomkovicz, supra note 134, at 1461 (observing society’s “sense that we are locked
in a mortal struggle with the enemy—criminals”).
403. See Co-Opting Compassion, supra note 241, at 584 (noting the popular view that
victims are “blameless”).
404. See Kanwar, supra note 199, at 231 (observing that “white female children” are “the
public’s preferred image of a ‘victim’”).
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defendants.405 In turn, tough-on-crime advocates may describe crime
victims as deserving of relief and contrast them with greedy tort
victims, lazy welfare recipients, and others who are not deserving
of government assistance.406 In fact, those “lazy welfare queens” and
other socially marginalized people, painted as paradigmatically
undeserving by Reagan and like-minded others,407 empirically
constitute the majority of crime victims.408
The category “victims” as constructed by victims’ rights ideology,
however, presumptively excludes “welfare queens.”409 Within popu-
lar political discourse, victims are not racial, cultural, and socioeco-
nomic others. They are white, middle-class, law-abiding citizens who
have been subjected to horrific violence and demand harsh punish-
ment of offenders.410 Thus, “[t]he public face of the Victims’ Rights
Movement hides the most severely affected victims of violent crime,
sexism and racism.”411 By contrast, prototypical criminals are defi-
nitionally other—either psychopathic monsters or angry minority
perpetrators of urban crimes.412 The relentless publicizing of irre-
deemable criminals successfully dethroned the historically preva-
lent view of defendants as ordinary citizens affected by life circum-
stances beyond their control413 and installed an ethic of exclusive
405. See Demleitner, supra note 241, at 568 (remarking that “[t]he victim became
increasingly pitted against the offender, and only long sentences appeared to validate her pain
and suffering”).
406. See Barker, supra note 230, at 626 (“[T]he demand to restrict criminal offenders’ rights
emerged out of a backlash against ... welfarism.”); Fleury-Steiner, supra note 380, at 569
(discussing a death penalty juror who considered himself a “‘conservative avenger’” to “‘even
the score’ against the pro-welfare, liberal establishment”).
407. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
408. See Kanwar, supra note 199, at 231 (noting the shared demographics of victims and
criminals).
409. Cf. Co-Opting Compassion, supra note 241, at 585 (discussing President Clinton’s
statement that “[w]e sure don’t want to give criminals like gang members” victims’ rights
(quoting William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at Announcement in Support of a Victims’
Rights Amendment, 1 PUB. PAPERS 976 (June 25, 1996))).
410. See id. at 584 (observing the construction of victims as “attractive, middle class, and
white” persons subjected to “particularly brutal homicides”); supra notes 403-05.
411. Kanwar, supra note 199, at 231.
412. See Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory, supra note 91, at 1621 (contending that the media
has led “white” America to “see crime as something that is committed by others”); Co-Opting
Compassion, supra note 241, at 586-87 (contending that society views defendants as
“monsters,” or “undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male[s]”).
413. See Barker, supra note 230, at 625 (noting that defendants, once seen as “victims of
social deprivation,” were replaced by “‘innocent victims’ in need of state action”).
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victim identification.414 Austin Sarat deconstructs a capital prose-
cutor’s argument, “We have a right to be vindicated and protected”:
“We” is both an inclusive and a violent naming, a naming
fraught with racial meaning. Who is included in the “we”? While
this “we” reaches from this world to the next as a remembrance
of and identification with [the white victim], at the same time,
it makes the black [defendant] an outsider in a community that
needs protection from people like him.415
Despite these dominant tort and criminal law narratives, many
continue to identify with tort plaintiffs’ plights and others continue
to prioritize defendants’ liberty over victims’ punitive demands.
As a result, crime victims’ advocates and tort reformers seek legal
changes that minimize these intuitions while reflecting and rein-
forcing their preferred views of victimhood and responsibility. The
tough-on-crime and tort reform rhetorical techniques for achieving
legal reform are actually quite congruent: characterize the status
quo as existing in a moment of crisis, criticize the law and courts as
illegitimate and incompetent for failing to respond in the desired
manner, and argue for reform.416 
In the tort context, the crisis is an “explosion” of frivolous liti-
gation.417 Carefully crafted political messages and media sensation-
alism have led the public to believe that the majority of tort suits
are in fact ill-founded.418 Tort reformers follow up with the claim
414. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 34, at 9 (linking the success of the victims’
rights movement to psychic benefits of “identification with the victim”); see also FRANK G.
CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 20 (1978) (contending that the “average citizen”
is more “worried about ... becoming a victim” than being falsely accused).
415. Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 19, 49 (1993).
416. See Feld, supra note 90, at 1532 (“News media coverage of criminal justice
administration typically emphasizes the ‘failures’—defendants freed on legal ‘technicalities’
and by lenient judges—and presents advocates for more severe punishment as the remedy.”);
supra note 392.
417. See Hubbard, supra note 363, at 471 (observing that tort reformers decry a “lawsuit
crisis”).
418. See, e.g., Contract with America, supra note 355; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous
Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE
L.J. 447, 447-51 (2004) (contending that the “media’s delight in profiling loony litigation,”
combined with “political polemics and business-sponsored media campaigns,” created
“widespread agreement that the nation has too much frivolous litigation”).
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that courts and juries are incompetent and unfair because they
engage in redistribution and argue for reform to narrow the law’s
reach over defendants.419 As one expert explains:
[The] push for reform has attempted to gain public support of its
legislative agenda and its ideology through the use of massive
publicity campaigns that share a common rhetorical emphasis
on the importance of widely shared values like fairness, effi-
ciency, and personal responsibility.... This rhetoric is bolstered
by attacks on plaintiffs and on the judicial system by means of
the constant repetition of an asserted need to address a crisis
and of anecdotal “horror stories” about the “tort tax,” a “litiga-
tion explosion,” “lawsuit abuse,” “frivolous lawsuits,” “judicial
hellholes” and “dishonorable” courts.420
Similarly, the first step in cementing tough-on-crime ideology
involved media and political campaigns that described the magni-
tude of the crime problem as apocalyptic.421 Although in the
formative years of the war on crime, crime rates were in fact
elevated, it was not reality but political salience that kept the
“crisis” of violent crime in headlines.422 For the past twenty years,
crime rates have been decreasing423 while public perception con-
tinues to be that crime rates are at an all-time high.424 Like tort
419. See supra note 392; infra notes 428 and accompanying text.
420. Hubbard, supra note 363, at 474.
421. See Rape and Feminism, supra note 29, at 621-22 (asserting that tough-on-crime
politicians “routinely hyperbolize the danger of crime”); see also 151 CONG. REC. 20,461,
20,464 (2005) (statement of Rep. Poe) (supporting the 2005 Child Safety Act to “stop the
epidemic of violence and sexual abuse” and stating that “we have been reaping the destruction
of [Hurricane Katrina] ... [b]ut we have been for years reaping the greater destruction of a
hurricane that continues to bring the wind, rain, and floods of the effects of child predators
on America”).
422. See supra note 230.
423. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOUR MEASURES OF
SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME, http://bjs/ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/4meastab.cfm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2010) (showing stable rates for “actual” crimes between 1973 and 1994,
dramatically decreasing rates between 1995 and 2001, and stable rates from 2001 to 2007,
with a spike in 2006 and dip in 2007). In 2007, the last year recorded, crimes were at a
historic low. See id.
424. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 2.33 (2008), http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2332008.pdf (reporting that between 1989 and 2008, save
for two years, a majority of respondents (67 percent in 2008) believed crime was up from the
previous year).
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reformers, victims’ rights advocates condemn the legal system as
inadequately responsive to the crime problem and call for radical
changes.425 Unlike tort reformers who argue that tort law should
be more attuned to fault and eradicate illegitimate distributive
concerns, the victims’ rights movement seeks to make criminal law
less attuned to fault and more concerned with victims’ distributive
interests.426 Conservative ideology thus regards the tort system as
hopelessly flawed because it is distributive, but simultaneously
views the criminal system as inadequate because it is not distribu-
tive enough.427 Many of the voices that exhort lawmakers to purge
distributive considerations from individual tort cases invite crim-
inal sentencing courts and juries to become roving calculators of
punishment on the basis of victim suffering. 
By this account, there is no principled conservative rejection of
government distribution. Right-leaning policymakers do not with-
hold support whenever a legal rule is distributive. They only
withhold it when the distributive rule burdens a favored group. For
example, tort reformers condemn tort juries’ distributive tendencies
as illicit sentiments that require strict legal control,428 but encour-
age and glorify criminal juries’ desires to serve victims’ interests.429
Consider Justice O’Connor’s argument that tort jury instructions
must specifically guide jurors on how to assess punitive damages: 
In my view, [state punitive damage] instructions are so
fraught with uncertainty that they defy rational implementa-
tion. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and unpredictable
results by inviting juries to rely on private beliefs and personal
predilections. Juries are permitted to target unpopular defen-
dants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistrib-
ute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.430
425. See supra Part III.A.
426. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.2.
427. See Roederer, supra note 363, at 678 (remarking that tort reformers view judges as
“neutral referees, rather than guardians of justice”); supra note 269.
428. See Deborah R. Hensler, Jurors in the Material World: Putting Tort Verdicts in Their
Social Context, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 8, 14 (2008) (observing the conservative
critique of tort juries’ “predilection for wealth redistribution”).
429. See supra Part III.B.2.
430. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Compare this with her view of jury competence to assess victim
impact statements and appropriately determine to send a defendant
to his death:
The State called as a witness Mary Zvolanek, Nicholas’ grand-
mother. Her testimony was brief. She explained that Nicholas
cried for his mother and baby sister and could not understand
why they did not come home. I do not doubt that the jurors were
moved by this testimony-who would not have been? But surely
this brief statement did not inflame their passions more than did
the facts of the crime ....
... In arguing that Payne deserved the death penalty, the
prosecutor sought to remind the jury that Charisse and Lacie
were more than just lifeless bodies on a videotape, that they
were unique human beings. The prosecutor remarked that
Charisse would never again sing a lullaby to her son and that
Lacie would never attend a high school prom. In my view, these
statements were permissible.431
Within right-leaning philosophy, it is unfair and uncaring to prevent
the admission of evidence in a death sentencing that would allow
the decision maker to exercise empathy.432 When it comes to private
law cases in which victims claim racial discrimination, empathy
must be purged from the legal process, and the decision maker made
to swear to emotionless neutrality.433 
The one area in which conservative thinkers appear to prioritize
a commitment to liberalism over the tough-on-crime agenda is rape
law. Feminist rape reformers support polices like rape-shield and
affirmative consent laws that seek to make rape trials fairer and
431. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831-32 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
432. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990) (calling the exclusion of victim
impact evidence “an affront to the civilized members of the human race”); 153 CONG. REC.
S8742, S8746 (daily ed. June 29, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“A victim is not treated justly
and equitably if her views are not even before the court.”); supra note 346 and accompanying
text.
433. This message was delivered in stark fashion at Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation
hearings. See 155 CONG. REC. S8822, S8823 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Coburn) (stating that empathy is “antithetical to the proper role of a judge”); Senator Jon Kyl,
Opening Statement at Sotomayor Hearing (July 13, 2009), http://kyl.senate.gov/record.
cfm?id=315656 (characterizing empathy based on “‘gender and Latina heritage’” as
“prejudices, biases, and passions,” but stating that during “sentencing, it may not be wrong
for judges to be empathetic”).
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less traumatic for rape victims.434 Far from embracing these victim-
friendly laws, conservatives and “third wave” feminists criticize the
reforms as contrary to the liberal ideal that women should be
individually responsible agents.435 The retreat of conservatives to
rights-based claims in this context further underscores the fluidity
and political nature of their commitment against distribution. The
political story that plays out in date rape cases is very different from
the politics of general criminal prosecution discussed above.436 Many
accused date rapists, and certainly the ones who make headlines, do
not necessarily belong to the subordinated groups to which defen-
dants often belong.437 Moreover, date rape reforms seek to change
male behaviors that many people—especially those who harbor
traditional views of gender roles—see as normal.438
As a consequence, date rape reforms are not politically popular
like other victim-centered criminal laws.439 Unlike the general
“monster versus angel” narrative of crime, popular date rape
narratives often portray the female complainant as irresponsible, or
434. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1274 (N.J. 1992) (characterizing the affirmative
consent standard as a response to old law that put the victim on trial); Rape and Feminism,
supra note 29, at 595-603 (discussing rape reforms); Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised
by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1599 (2007) (noting that rape-shield laws seek to
“spar[e] women humiliation”).
435. See, e.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS
62 (1993) (arguing that affirmative consent “proposes that women, like children, have trouble
communicating what they want”); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape,
Affirmative Consent to Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 847 (2008)
(critiquing affirmative consent as “fueled by the notion that contemporary women can’t say
‘no’”). 
436. See supra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
437. See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 219 (1989) (quoting a juror who explained acquittal on the basis that the defendant
was “[a] nice-looking young fellow,” “[n]ice[ly] dressed, like a college boy”).
438. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 684-85 (1999)
(citing studies finding that men often believe coercive behavior is normal seduction).
439. See Rape and Feminism, supra note 29, at 638 (asserting that “reforms aimed at
countering racial and gender stereotypes within the criminal system have very little purchase
among those who advocate retribution and victims’ rights”).
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worse, a liar440 and the “nice boy” defendant as the true victim.441
Many are thus keenly attuned to danger that rape reform could hurt
“innocent” defendants and downplay the distributive benefits to
victims by disclaiming that they are real victims and asserting that,
like tort plaintiffs, they should have been more careful.442 As a
result, when feminists propose legal changes to remedy gender-
based distributive inequities in the criminal trial, opponents
respond with principled objections to tinkering with rights to
achieve social change and assertions of victims’ individual responsi-
bility.
CONCLUSION
For better or worse, we have been living with distribution in the
criminal law for centuries. The distributive basis for criminal law
existed in small pockets of the law even when prevailing penal
philosophy stressed that criminal law was all about defendants—
their culpability, reformation potential, and dangerousness. Where
harm was particularly great, as in the case of a felon who kills,
distributive concerns poked through the otherwise retributive
fabric of criminal law. In the current era, the rise of penal distribu-
tionism coincided with the retrenchment of distribution in politics
and private law. Policymakers who condemned big government
and welfare and extolled the virtues of individual responsibility
sponsored legislation creating a massive governance structure
concerned with creating a distributive balance between individuals
involved in a criminal transaction. Despite the prominence of rights
and self-reliance rhetoric, popular ideology welcomes the use of
state penal authority to satisfy crime victims’ interests. Thus,
conservatives’ claimed pre-political commitment against govern-
440. See John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It’s Time for “No” To Really Mean “No,” 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 3, 7 (1993) (observing “a widespread belief that the female gender is rife with
spiteful shrews who often falsely accuse men”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 995
n.58 (1993) (citing a survey in which 38 percent of men and 37 percent of women indicated a
seductively dressed woman is partly responsible for rape).
441. See Rape and Feminism, supra note 29, at 598 (noting the “media publicizing cases
of false reporting, in which accused date rapists play the role of folk heroes”).
442. See, e.g., id.; Subotnik, supra note 435, at 848 (“I never want to see a man’s life
devastated through a bad rap from some vindictive woman.”).
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ment distribution simply breaks down to a sophistic tool to be used
or discarded in favor of dominant or politically relevant interests. 
Understanding criminal law as a matter of distribution also opens
up several interesting avenues of future analysis. For example,
revealing the distributive basis of criminal law sets the stage for
assessing whether current victim-based laws actually meet their
purported distributive goals. Although touting victim-centered
reforms serves prosecutors’ and policymakers’ interests, it is
another question altogether whether such reforms actually improve
victims’ lives. Many scholars argue that victims heal by forgiving
defendants and understanding the contextuality of the crime, not by
engaging in acts of pure vengeance. Additional questions involve
whether judges and juries are well suited to assess victim closure,
whether fair distribution requires doing what crime victims
purportedly want, and whether closure is something that must be
distributed in a just society. All these questions I leave for another
day. For now, it suffices to say that there is a distributive basis for
criminal law, it has been with us for some time, and it is not going
away soon.
